https://vulnerability.circl.lu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Sun, 04 Oct 2026 21:52:00 +0000 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-54325 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> earendil-works pi</p> <p>Pi is a minimal terminal coding harness. Pi before 0.79.0 loaded project-local configuration and resources from a repository&#39;s .pi directory without first asking the user to trust that repository. This included project-local extensions, which are executable TypeScript or JavaScript modules loaded into the Pi process. An attacker who controls a repository could place Pi-specific project resources in that repository. If a user then started Pi from that working tree, the project-local extension code could run with the same privileges as the local Pi process without the user having a convenient way to make a trust decision. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.79.0.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> earendil-works pi</p> <p>Pi is a minimal terminal coding harness. Pi before 0.79.0 loaded project-local configuration and resources from a repository&#39;s .pi directory without first asking the user to trust that repository. This included project-local extensions, which are executable TypeScript or JavaScript modules loaded into the Pi process. An attacker who controls a repository could place Pi-specific project resources in that repository. If a user then started Pi from that working tree, the project-local extension code could run with the same privileges as the local Pi process without the user having a convenient way to make a trust decision. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.79.0.</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-54325 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-mqxh-6gq7-558m <p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: @earendil-works/pi-coding-agent</p> <p># Pi loads project-local extensions without approval</p> <p>Pi before 0.79.0 loaded project-local configuration and resources from a repository&#39;s `.pi` directory without first asking the user to trust that repository. This included project-local extensions, which are executable TypeScript or JavaScript modules loaded into the Pi process.</p> <p>An attacker who controls a repository could place Pi-specific project resources in that repository. If a user then started Pi from that working tree, the project-local extension code could run with the same privileges as the local Pi process without the user having a convenient way to make a trust decision.</p> <p>## Info</p> <p>The affected component is Pi&#39;s project resource loading path. Before 0.79.0, startup loaded project `.pi/settings.json`, auto-discovered `.pi` resources, project package-managed resources, and project instruction files as part of normal session initialization. Project-local extensions were included in the same extension set as user/global extensions and were initialized before there was a project trust boundary.</p> <p>Extensions like pi itself are not sandboxed. They run in the Pi process and can register commands, tools, and event handlers. The vulnerable behavior was not a privilege escalation across an operating-system boundary, but it allowed repository-controlled Pi extension code to execute implicitly when a user ran Pi in that repository.</p> <p>## Impact</p> <p>Exploitation requires user interaction: the attacker must get a user to open or ot…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: @earendil-works/pi-coding-agent</p> <p># Pi loads project-local extensions without approval</p> <p>Pi before 0.79.0 loaded project-local configuration and resources from a repository&#39;s `.pi` directory without first asking the user to trust that repository. This included project-local extensions, which are executable TypeScript or JavaScript modules loaded into the Pi process.</p> <p>An attacker who controls a repository could place Pi-specific project resources in that repository. If a user then started Pi from that working tree, the project-local extension code could run with the same privileges as the local Pi process without the user having a convenient way to make a trust decision.</p> <p>## Info</p> <p>The affected component is Pi&#39;s project resource loading path. Before 0.79.0, startup loaded project `.pi/settings.json`, auto-discovered `.pi` resources, project package-managed resources, and project instruction files as part of normal session initialization. Project-local extensions were included in the same extension set as user/global extensions and were initialized before there was a project trust boundary.</p> <p>Extensions like pi itself are not sandboxed. They run in the Pi process and can register commands, tools, and event handlers. The vulnerable behavior was not a privilege escalation across an operating-system boundary, but it allowed repository-controlled Pi extension code to execute implicitly when a user ran Pi in that repository.</p> <p>## Impact</p> <p>Exploitation requires user interaction: the attacker must get a user to open or ot…</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-mqxh-6gq7-558m