https://vulnerability.circl.lu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Mon, 05 Oct 2026 01:36:16 +0000 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-w7j5-j98m-w679 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: openclaw</p> <p>Three Dockerfiles in scripts/docker/ and scripts/e2e/ lack a USER directive, meaning all processes run as uid 0 (root). If any process is compromised, the attacker has root inside the container, making container breakout significantly easier. **Partial fix (2026-02-08):** Commit 28e1a65e added USER sandbox to Dockerfile.sandbox and Dockerfile.sandbox-browser. The E2E/test Dockerfiles listed below remain unpatched.</p> <p>**Affected components:** - scripts/e2e/Dockerfile - scripts/e2e/Dockerfile.qr-import - scripts/docker/install-sh-e2e/Dockerfile - scripts/docker/install-sh-nonroot/Dockerfile (runs as app but with NOPASSWD sudo — see related advisory)</p> <p>**Technical Reproduction:** 1. Open each Dockerfile listed above and search for a USER directive — none found. 2. Run any of these containers: docker run --rm -it &lt;image&gt; id 3. Observe: returns uid=0(root).</p> <p>**Demonstrated Impact:** - Root inside the container enables kernel exploit attempts, volume mount abuse, and privileged syscall access. - Test images share the same base (node:22-bookworm) as production, creating risk of accidental deployment of root-running images.</p> <p>**Environment:** Base images node:22-bookworm and node:22-bookworm-slim default to root. Dockerfile.sandbox and Dockerfile.sandbox-browser were remediated in commit 28e1a65e; only the E2E/test images listed above remain affected.</p> <p>**Remediation:** Add a USER directive before CMD/ENTRYPOINT in each remaining Dockerfile: RUN useradd --create-home --shell /bin/bash…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: openclaw</p> <p>Three Dockerfiles in scripts/docker/ and scripts/e2e/ lack a USER directive, meaning all processes run as uid 0 (root). If any process is compromised, the attacker has root inside the container, making container breakout significantly easier. **Partial fix (2026-02-08):** Commit 28e1a65e added USER sandbox to Dockerfile.sandbox and Dockerfile.sandbox-browser. The E2E/test Dockerfiles listed below remain unpatched.</p> <p>**Affected components:** - scripts/e2e/Dockerfile - scripts/e2e/Dockerfile.qr-import - scripts/docker/install-sh-e2e/Dockerfile - scripts/docker/install-sh-nonroot/Dockerfile (runs as app but with NOPASSWD sudo — see related advisory)</p> <p>**Technical Reproduction:** 1. Open each Dockerfile listed above and search for a USER directive — none found. 2. Run any of these containers: docker run --rm -it &lt;image&gt; id 3. Observe: returns uid=0(root).</p> <p>**Demonstrated Impact:** - Root inside the container enables kernel exploit attempts, volume mount abuse, and privileged syscall access. - Test images share the same base (node:22-bookworm) as production, creating risk of accidental deployment of root-running images.</p> <p>**Environment:** Base images node:22-bookworm and node:22-bookworm-slim default to root. Dockerfile.sandbox and Dockerfile.sandbox-browser were remediated in commit 28e1a65e; only the E2E/test images listed above remain affected.</p> <p>**Remediation:** Add a USER directive before CMD/ENTRYPOINT in each remaining Dockerfile: RUN useradd --create-home --shell /bin/bash…</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-w7j5-j98m-w679