https://vulnerability.circl.lu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Mon, 28 Sep 2026 18:37:46 +0000 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-45004 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> OpenClaw</p> <p>OpenClaw before 2026.4.23 contains an arbitrary code execution vulnerability in the bundled plugin setup resolver that loads setup-api.js from process.cwd() during provider setup metadata resolution. Attackers can execute arbitrary JavaScript under the current user account by placing a malicious extensions/&lt;plugin&gt;/setup-api.js file in a repository and convincing a user to run OpenClaw commands from that directory.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> OpenClaw</p> <p>OpenClaw before 2026.4.23 contains an arbitrary code execution vulnerability in the bundled plugin setup resolver that loads setup-api.js from process.cwd() during provider setup metadata resolution. Attackers can execute arbitrary JavaScript under the current user account by placing a malicious extensions/&lt;plugin&gt;/setup-api.js file in a repository and convincing a user to run OpenClaw commands from that directory.</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-45004 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-r39h-4c2p-3jxp <p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: openclaw</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>OpenClaw&#39;s bundled plugin setup resolver could fall back to `process.cwd()` while resolving provider setup metadata. If a user ran an OpenClaw command from an attacker-controlled repository containing `extensions/&lt;plugin&gt;/setup-api.js`, OpenClaw could load and execute that JavaScript during ordinary provider/model status resolution.</p> <p>## Impact</p> <p>This is arbitrary JavaScript execution in the OpenClaw process under the current user account. A malicious repository could run code when the user executed commands such as provider/model inspection from that directory. The issue does not require gateway network exposure, but it does require user interaction: the user must run OpenClaw from a directory containing the attacker-controlled setup file.</p> <p>## Affected Packages / Versions</p> <p>- Package: `openclaw` on npm - Affected: versions before `2026.4.23` - Fixed: `2026.4.23` - Latest stable verified fixed: `openclaw@2026.4.23`, tag `v2026.4.23`</p> <p>## Fix</p> <p>OpenClaw now resolves bundled setup fallbacks only from the canonical package/repository root and no longer includes `process.cwd()` as a trusted setup-api search root. A regression test verifies that a workspace-local `extensions/&lt;plugin&gt;/setup-api.js` is not loaded through provider setup resolution.</p> <p>## Fix Commit(s)</p> <p>- `993781e6e6eaf50f033cfc3e3bf4f47059740707` (`fix(plugins): ignore cwd setup-api fallback`)</p> <p>## Severity</p> <p>Severity remains `high` because successful exploitation allows arbitrary code execution under the user ru…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: openclaw</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>OpenClaw&#39;s bundled plugin setup resolver could fall back to `process.cwd()` while resolving provider setup metadata. If a user ran an OpenClaw command from an attacker-controlled repository containing `extensions/&lt;plugin&gt;/setup-api.js`, OpenClaw could load and execute that JavaScript during ordinary provider/model status resolution.</p> <p>## Impact</p> <p>This is arbitrary JavaScript execution in the OpenClaw process under the current user account. A malicious repository could run code when the user executed commands such as provider/model inspection from that directory. The issue does not require gateway network exposure, but it does require user interaction: the user must run OpenClaw from a directory containing the attacker-controlled setup file.</p> <p>## Affected Packages / Versions</p> <p>- Package: `openclaw` on npm - Affected: versions before `2026.4.23` - Fixed: `2026.4.23` - Latest stable verified fixed: `openclaw@2026.4.23`, tag `v2026.4.23`</p> <p>## Fix</p> <p>OpenClaw now resolves bundled setup fallbacks only from the canonical package/repository root and no longer includes `process.cwd()` as a trusted setup-api search root. A regression test verifies that a workspace-local `extensions/&lt;plugin&gt;/setup-api.js` is not loaded through provider setup resolution.</p> <p>## Fix Commit(s)</p> <p>- `993781e6e6eaf50f033cfc3e3bf4f47059740707` (`fix(plugins): ignore cwd setup-api fallback`)</p> <p>## Severity</p> <p>Severity remains `high` because successful exploitation allows arbitrary code execution under the user ru…</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-r39h-4c2p-3jxp