https://vulnerability.circl.lu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Mon, 05 Oct 2026 04:53:22 +0000 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-27004 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> openclaw</p> <p>OpenClaw is a personal AI assistant. Prior to version 2026.2.15, in some shared-agent deployments, OpenClaw session tools (`sessions_list`, `sessions_history`, `sessions_send`) allowed broader session targeting than some operators intended. This is primarily a configuration/visibility-scoping issue in multi-user environments where peers are not equally trusted. In Telegram webhook mode, monitor startup also did not fall back to per-account `webhookSecret` when only the account-level secret was configured. In shared-agent, multi-user, less-trusted environments: session-tool access could expose transcript content across peer sessions. In single-agent or trusted environments, practical impact is limited. In Telegram webhook mode, account-level secret wiring could be missed unless an explicit monitor webhook secret override was provided. Version 2026.2.15 fixes the issue.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> openclaw</p> <p>OpenClaw is a personal AI assistant. Prior to version 2026.2.15, in some shared-agent deployments, OpenClaw session tools (`sessions_list`, `sessions_history`, `sessions_send`) allowed broader session targeting than some operators intended. This is primarily a configuration/visibility-scoping issue in multi-user environments where peers are not equally trusted. In Telegram webhook mode, monitor startup also did not fall back to per-account `webhookSecret` when only the account-level secret was configured. In shared-agent, multi-user, less-trusted environments: session-tool access could expose transcript content across peer sessions. In single-agent or trusted environments, practical impact is limited. In Telegram webhook mode, account-level secret wiring could be missed unless an explicit monitor webhook secret override was provided. Version 2026.2.15 fixes the issue.</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-27004 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-6hf3-mhgc-cm65 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: openclaw</p> <p>## Vulnerability</p> <p>In some shared-agent deployments, OpenClaw session tools (`sessions_list`, `sessions_history`, `sessions_send`) allowed broader session targeting than some operators intended. This is primarily a configuration/visibility-scoping issue in multi-user environments where peers are not equally trusted.</p> <p>In Telegram webhook mode, monitor startup also did not fall back to per-account `webhookSecret` when only the account-level secret was configured.</p> <p>## Typical Use Case Context</p> <p>Most regular OpenClaw deployments run a single agent, or run in trusted environments. In those setups, practical risk from this issue is generally low.</p> <p>## Impact</p> <p>- Shared-agent, multi-user, less-trusted environments: session-tool access could expose transcript content across peer sessions. - Single-agent or trusted environments: practical impact is limited. - Telegram webhook mode: account-level secret wiring could be missed unless an explicit monitor webhook secret override was provided.</p> <p>## Affected Packages / Versions</p> <p>- Package: npm `openclaw` - Affected versions: `&lt;= 2026.2.14` - Patched version: `2026.2.15` (planned next release)</p> <p>## Remediation</p> <p>- Add and enforce `tools.sessions.visibility` (`self | tree | agent | all`) across session tools, defaulting to `tree`. - Keep sandbox clamping behavior so sandboxed runs can be restricted to spawned/session-tree visibility. - Resolve Telegram webhook secret from account config fallback in monitor webhook startup.</p> <p>## Fix Commit(s)</p> <p>- `c6c…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: openclaw</p> <p>## Vulnerability</p> <p>In some shared-agent deployments, OpenClaw session tools (`sessions_list`, `sessions_history`, `sessions_send`) allowed broader session targeting than some operators intended. This is primarily a configuration/visibility-scoping issue in multi-user environments where peers are not equally trusted.</p> <p>In Telegram webhook mode, monitor startup also did not fall back to per-account `webhookSecret` when only the account-level secret was configured.</p> <p>## Typical Use Case Context</p> <p>Most regular OpenClaw deployments run a single agent, or run in trusted environments. In those setups, practical risk from this issue is generally low.</p> <p>## Impact</p> <p>- Shared-agent, multi-user, less-trusted environments: session-tool access could expose transcript content across peer sessions. - Single-agent or trusted environments: practical impact is limited. - Telegram webhook mode: account-level secret wiring could be missed unless an explicit monitor webhook secret override was provided.</p> <p>## Affected Packages / Versions</p> <p>- Package: npm `openclaw` - Affected versions: `&lt;= 2026.2.14` - Patched version: `2026.2.15` (planned next release)</p> <p>## Remediation</p> <p>- Add and enforce `tools.sessions.visibility` (`self | tree | agent | all`) across session tools, defaulting to `tree`. - Keep sandbox clamping behavior so sandboxed runs can be restricted to spawned/session-tree visibility. - Resolve Telegram webhook secret from account config fallback in monitor webhook startup.</p> <p>## Fix Commit(s)</p> <p>- `c6c…</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-6hf3-mhgc-cm65