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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 11:18:30 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-48045 — Zeroconf: Unbounded TC-deferred queue allows LAN-local memory exhaustion via spoofed-source flood</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-48045</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; python-zeroconf&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Zeroconf is a pure Python implementation of multicast DNS service discovery. Prior to 0.149.12, AsyncListener.handle_query_or_defer retained every truncated TC-bit incoming query, each up to _MAX_MSG_ABSOLUTE = 8966 bytes, in self._deferred[addr] and armed a per-address timer in self._timers[addr] without capping the per-address list or distinct addr keys, allowing unauthenticated hosts on the local link over UDP/5353 (224.0.0.251 / ff02::fb) to spoof sources, grow _deferred and _timers, and cause memory exhaustion and quadratic CPU burn. This issue is fixed in version 0.149.12.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; python-zeroconf&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Zeroconf is a pure Python implementation of multicast DNS service discovery. Prior to 0.149.12, AsyncListener.handle_query_or_defer retained every truncated TC-bit incoming query, each up to _MAX_MSG_ABSOLUTE = 8966 bytes, in self._deferred[addr] and armed a per-address timer in self._timers[addr] without capping the per-address list or distinct addr keys, allowing unauthenticated hosts on the local link over UDP/5353 (224.0.0.251 / ff02::fb) to spoof sources, grow _deferred and _timers, and cause memory exhaustion and quadratic CPU burn. This issue is fixed in version 0.149.12.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-48045</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-9663-mqmp-p9mm — python-zeroconf: Unbounded TC-deferred queue allows LAN-local memory exhaustion via spoofed-source flood</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-9663-mqmp-p9mm</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: zeroconf&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`AsyncListener.handle_query_or_defer` retained every truncated (TC-bit) incoming query in `self._deferred[addr]` and armed a per-addr timer in `self._timers[addr]` that flushed the reassembled query within ~500 ms (RFC 6762 §18.5). Neither the per-addr list nor the number of distinct `addr` keys was capped, and the dedup check (`for incoming in reversed(deferred): if incoming.data == msg.data`) ran O(N) over the per-addr list on every arrival.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Any unauthenticated host on the local link (UDP/5353, `224.0.0.251` / `ff02::fb`) can stream byte-distinct TC-flagged mDNS queries — each up to `_MAX_MSG_ABSOLUTE = 8966` bytes, with `DNSIncoming` retaining the raw `data` buffer plus parsed-record state. Trivially spoofed source IPs multiply the effect across `_deferred` / `_timers`, and the O(N) data compare burns CPU quadratically as each per-addr queue grows. On memory-constrained deployments (Home Assistant on Raspberry-Pi-class hardware is the canonical victim) sustained traffic OOM-kills the process; under lighter load, the per-arrival scan and event-loop scheduler starvation break unrelated zeroconf consumers (discovery, registration, ServiceBrowser callbacks).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fixed in `zeroconf` 0.149.12 ([PR #1751](https://github.com/python-zeroconf/python-zeroconf/pull/1751)). Upgrade to `&amp;gt;= 0.149.12`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Workarounds&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;There is no in-process workaround; upgrading is the fix. Otherwise, restrict mDNS (UDP/5353) to trusted Layer-2 segments via AP client isolation, g…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: zeroconf&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`AsyncListener.handle_query_or_defer` retained every truncated (TC-bit) incoming query in `self._deferred[addr]` and armed a per-addr timer in `self._timers[addr]` that flushed the reassembled query within ~500 ms (RFC 6762 §18.5). Neither the per-addr list nor the number of distinct `addr` keys was capped, and the dedup check (`for incoming in reversed(deferred): if incoming.data == msg.data`) ran O(N) over the per-addr list on every arrival.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Any unauthenticated host on the local link (UDP/5353, `224.0.0.251` / `ff02::fb`) can stream byte-distinct TC-flagged mDNS queries — each up to `_MAX_MSG_ABSOLUTE = 8966` bytes, with `DNSIncoming` retaining the raw `data` buffer plus parsed-record state. Trivially spoofed source IPs multiply the effect across `_deferred` / `_timers`, and the O(N) data compare burns CPU quadratically as each per-addr queue grows. On memory-constrained deployments (Home Assistant on Raspberry-Pi-class hardware is the canonical victim) sustained traffic OOM-kills the process; under lighter load, the per-arrival scan and event-loop scheduler starvation break unrelated zeroconf consumers (discovery, registration, ServiceBrowser callbacks).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fixed in `zeroconf` 0.149.12 ([PR #1751](https://github.com/python-zeroconf/python-zeroconf/pull/1751)). Upgrade to `&amp;gt;= 0.149.12`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Workarounds&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;There is no in-process workaround; upgrading is the fix. Otherwise, restrict mDNS (UDP/5353) to trusted Layer-2 segments via AP client isolation, g…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-9663-mqmp-p9mm</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>PYSEC-2026-3435 — python-zeroconf: Unbounded TC-deferred queue allows LAN-local memory exhaustion via spoofed-source flood</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-3435</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: zeroconf&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`AsyncListener.handle_query_or_defer` retained every truncated (TC-bit) incoming query in `self._deferred[addr]` and armed a per-addr timer in `self._timers[addr]` that flushed the reassembled query within ~500 ms (RFC 6762 §18.5). Neither the per-addr list nor the number of distinct `addr` keys was capped, and the dedup check (`for incoming in reversed(deferred): if incoming.data == msg.data`) ran O(N) over the per-addr list on every arrival.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Any unauthenticated host on the local link (UDP/5353, `224.0.0.251` / `ff02::fb`) can stream byte-distinct TC-flagged mDNS queries — each up to `_MAX_MSG_ABSOLUTE = 8966` bytes, with `DNSIncoming` retaining the raw `data` buffer plus parsed-record state. Trivially spoofed source IPs multiply the effect across `_deferred` / `_timers`, and the O(N) data compare burns CPU quadratically as each per-addr queue grows. On memory-constrained deployments (Home Assistant on Raspberry-Pi-class hardware is the canonical victim) sustained traffic OOM-kills the process; under lighter load, the per-arrival scan and event-loop scheduler starvation break unrelated zeroconf consumers (discovery, registration, ServiceBrowser callbacks).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fixed in `zeroconf` 0.149.12 ([PR #1751](https://github.com/python-zeroconf/python-zeroconf/pull/1751)). Upgrade to `&amp;gt;= 0.149.12`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Workarounds&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;There is no in-process workaround; upgrading is the fix. Otherwise, restrict mDNS (UDP/5353) to trusted Layer-2 segments via AP client isolation, g…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: zeroconf&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`AsyncListener.handle_query_or_defer` retained every truncated (TC-bit) incoming query in `self._deferred[addr]` and armed a per-addr timer in `self._timers[addr]` that flushed the reassembled query within ~500 ms (RFC 6762 §18.5). Neither the per-addr list nor the number of distinct `addr` keys was capped, and the dedup check (`for incoming in reversed(deferred): if incoming.data == msg.data`) ran O(N) over the per-addr list on every arrival.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Any unauthenticated host on the local link (UDP/5353, `224.0.0.251` / `ff02::fb`) can stream byte-distinct TC-flagged mDNS queries — each up to `_MAX_MSG_ABSOLUTE = 8966` bytes, with `DNSIncoming` retaining the raw `data` buffer plus parsed-record state. Trivially spoofed source IPs multiply the effect across `_deferred` / `_timers`, and the O(N) data compare burns CPU quadratically as each per-addr queue grows. On memory-constrained deployments (Home Assistant on Raspberry-Pi-class hardware is the canonical victim) sustained traffic OOM-kills the process; under lighter load, the per-arrival scan and event-loop scheduler starvation break unrelated zeroconf consumers (discovery, registration, ServiceBrowser callbacks).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fixed in `zeroconf` 0.149.12 ([PR #1751](https://github.com/python-zeroconf/python-zeroconf/pull/1751)). Upgrade to `&amp;gt;= 0.149.12`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Workarounds&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;There is no in-process workaround; upgrading is the fix. Otherwise, restrict mDNS (UDP/5353) to trusted Layer-2 segments via AP client isolation, g…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-3435</guid>
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