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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 15:21:38 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-47184 — Zeroconf: Unbounded DNS record cache allows LAN-local memory exhaustion via multicast flood</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-47184</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; python-zeroconf&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Zeroconf is a pure Python implementation of multicast DNS service discovery. Prior to 0.149.7, DNSCache._async_add inserted every response record into cache, _expirations, _expire_heap, and service_cache without a cap, allowing unauthenticated hosts on the local link over UDP/5353 (224.0.0.251 / ff02::fb) to multicast valid mDNS responses with unique names and cause memory exhaustion, slower cache lookups, slower async_expire passes, and broken discovery, registration, and ServiceBrowser callbacks. This issue is fixed in version 0.149.7.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; python-zeroconf&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Zeroconf is a pure Python implementation of multicast DNS service discovery. Prior to 0.149.7, DNSCache._async_add inserted every response record into cache, _expirations, _expire_heap, and service_cache without a cap, allowing unauthenticated hosts on the local link over UDP/5353 (224.0.0.251 / ff02::fb) to multicast valid mDNS responses with unique names and cause memory exhaustion, slower cache lookups, slower async_expire passes, and broken discovery, registration, and ServiceBrowser callbacks. This issue is fixed in version 0.149.7.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-47184</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-rfg2-pjw2-56x2 — zeroconf has unbounded DNS record cache that allows LAN-local memory exhaustion via multicast flood</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-rfg2-pjw2-56x2</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: zeroconf&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`DNSCache._async_add` inserted every response record into `cache`, `_expirations`, `_expire_heap`, and `service_cache` with no cap on entry count. The only pre-existing protection was a PTR TTL floor (`_DNS_PTR_MIN_TTL = 1125` s, RFC 6762 §10), which actually *prolonged* attacker-injected records, and a periodic `async_expire` on `_CACHE_CLEANUP_INTERVAL = 10` s that could not keep up with a flood.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Any unauthenticated host on the local link (UDP/5353, `224.0.0.251` / `ff02::fb`) can multicast valid mDNS responses with unique names (RFC 6762 §11 allows up to 253 bytes each) and watch them accumulate. On memory-constrained deployments (Home Assistant on Raspberry-Pi-class hardware is the canonical victim) sustained traffic OOM-kills the process; under lighter load, every cache lookup and every periodic expiry pass grows linearly slower, starving asyncio and breaking unrelated zeroconf consumers (discovery, registration, ServiceBrowser callbacks). A second variant — re-multicasting cached records with shifting TTLs — grows `_expire_heap` unbounded between cleanup runs without touching `cache` or `_total_records`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fixed in `zeroconf` 0.149.6 ([PR #1718](https://github.com/python-zeroconf/python-zeroconf/pull/1718)). Upgrade to `&amp;gt;= 0.149.6`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Workarounds&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;There is no in-process workaround; upgrading is the fix. Otherwise, restrict mDNS (UDP/5353) to trusted Layer-2 segments via AP client isolation, guest-network separation, or host firewall rules.…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: zeroconf&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`DNSCache._async_add` inserted every response record into `cache`, `_expirations`, `_expire_heap`, and `service_cache` with no cap on entry count. The only pre-existing protection was a PTR TTL floor (`_DNS_PTR_MIN_TTL = 1125` s, RFC 6762 §10), which actually *prolonged* attacker-injected records, and a periodic `async_expire` on `_CACHE_CLEANUP_INTERVAL = 10` s that could not keep up with a flood.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Any unauthenticated host on the local link (UDP/5353, `224.0.0.251` / `ff02::fb`) can multicast valid mDNS responses with unique names (RFC 6762 §11 allows up to 253 bytes each) and watch them accumulate. On memory-constrained deployments (Home Assistant on Raspberry-Pi-class hardware is the canonical victim) sustained traffic OOM-kills the process; under lighter load, every cache lookup and every periodic expiry pass grows linearly slower, starving asyncio and breaking unrelated zeroconf consumers (discovery, registration, ServiceBrowser callbacks). A second variant — re-multicasting cached records with shifting TTLs — grows `_expire_heap` unbounded between cleanup runs without touching `cache` or `_total_records`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fixed in `zeroconf` 0.149.6 ([PR #1718](https://github.com/python-zeroconf/python-zeroconf/pull/1718)). Upgrade to `&amp;gt;= 0.149.6`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Workarounds&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;There is no in-process workaround; upgrading is the fix. Otherwise, restrict mDNS (UDP/5353) to trusted Layer-2 segments via AP client isolation, guest-network separation, or host firewall rules.…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-rfg2-pjw2-56x2</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>PYSEC-2026-3439 — zeroconf has unbounded DNS record cache that allows LAN-local memory exhaustion via multicast flood</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-3439</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: zeroconf&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`DNSCache._async_add` inserted every response record into `cache`, `_expirations`, `_expire_heap`, and `service_cache` with no cap on entry count. The only pre-existing protection was a PTR TTL floor (`_DNS_PTR_MIN_TTL = 1125` s, RFC 6762 §10), which actually *prolonged* attacker-injected records, and a periodic `async_expire` on `_CACHE_CLEANUP_INTERVAL = 10` s that could not keep up with a flood.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Any unauthenticated host on the local link (UDP/5353, `224.0.0.251` / `ff02::fb`) can multicast valid mDNS responses with unique names (RFC 6762 §11 allows up to 253 bytes each) and watch them accumulate. On memory-constrained deployments (Home Assistant on Raspberry-Pi-class hardware is the canonical victim) sustained traffic OOM-kills the process; under lighter load, every cache lookup and every periodic expiry pass grows linearly slower, starving asyncio and breaking unrelated zeroconf consumers (discovery, registration, ServiceBrowser callbacks). A second variant — re-multicasting cached records with shifting TTLs — grows `_expire_heap` unbounded between cleanup runs without touching `cache` or `_total_records`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fixed in `zeroconf` 0.149.6 ([PR #1718](https://github.com/python-zeroconf/python-zeroconf/pull/1718)). Upgrade to `&amp;gt;= 0.149.6`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Workarounds&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;There is no in-process workaround; upgrading is the fix. Otherwise, restrict mDNS (UDP/5353) to trusted Layer-2 segments via AP client isolation, guest-network separation, or host firewall rules.…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: zeroconf&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`DNSCache._async_add` inserted every response record into `cache`, `_expirations`, `_expire_heap`, and `service_cache` with no cap on entry count. The only pre-existing protection was a PTR TTL floor (`_DNS_PTR_MIN_TTL = 1125` s, RFC 6762 §10), which actually *prolonged* attacker-injected records, and a periodic `async_expire` on `_CACHE_CLEANUP_INTERVAL = 10` s that could not keep up with a flood.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Any unauthenticated host on the local link (UDP/5353, `224.0.0.251` / `ff02::fb`) can multicast valid mDNS responses with unique names (RFC 6762 §11 allows up to 253 bytes each) and watch them accumulate. On memory-constrained deployments (Home Assistant on Raspberry-Pi-class hardware is the canonical victim) sustained traffic OOM-kills the process; under lighter load, every cache lookup and every periodic expiry pass grows linearly slower, starving asyncio and breaking unrelated zeroconf consumers (discovery, registration, ServiceBrowser callbacks). A second variant — re-multicasting cached records with shifting TTLs — grows `_expire_heap` unbounded between cleanup runs without touching `cache` or `_total_records`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fixed in `zeroconf` 0.149.6 ([PR #1718](https://github.com/python-zeroconf/python-zeroconf/pull/1718)). Upgrade to `&amp;gt;= 0.149.6`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Workarounds&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;There is no in-process workaround; upgrading is the fix. Otherwise, restrict mDNS (UDP/5353) to trusted Layer-2 segments via AP client isolation, guest-network separation, or host firewall rules.…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-3439</guid>
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