https://vulnerability.circl.lu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Mon, 28 Sep 2026 07:45:58 +0000 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-47183 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> python-zeroconf</p> <p>Zeroconf is a pure Python implementation of multicast DNS service discovery. Prior to 0.149.6, DNSIncoming._log_exception_debug and the four QuietLogger exception-dedup methods stored an unbounded _seen_logs dictionary keyed by attacker-influenced IncomingDecodeError messages, retaining sys.exc_info() tracebacks whose frame locals kept raw packet self.data buffers and allowing unauthenticated hosts on the local link over UDP/5353 (224.0.0.251 / ff02::fb) to drive memory growth until mDNS-dependent features degrade or the process is OOM-killed. This issue is fixed in version 0.149.6.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> python-zeroconf</p> <p>Zeroconf is a pure Python implementation of multicast DNS service discovery. Prior to 0.149.6, DNSIncoming._log_exception_debug and the four QuietLogger exception-dedup methods stored an unbounded _seen_logs dictionary keyed by attacker-influenced IncomingDecodeError messages, retaining sys.exc_info() tracebacks whose frame locals kept raw packet self.data buffers and allowing unauthenticated hosts on the local link over UDP/5353 (224.0.0.251 / ff02::fb) to drive memory growth until mDNS-dependent features degrade or the process is OOM-killed. This issue is fixed in version 0.149.6.</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-47183 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-phvx-9mgw-67r5 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: zeroconf</p> <p>### Impact `DNSIncoming._log_exception_debug` and the four `QuietLogger` exception-dedup methods stored an unbounded `_seen_logs` dict keyed by `str(sys.exc_info()[1])`. The seven `IncomingDecodeError` messages raised from `_read_name` / `_decode_labels_at_offset` (RFC 6762 §18 name-decoding error paths) all embed `self.source` — the peer&#39;s ephemeral source port, varying per packet — plus byte `offset` and pointer `link`, so every attacker-influenced combination produced a fresh dedup key. The stored value was the full `sys.exc_info()` triple, whose traceback&#39;s frame locals retained `self.data` (the raw inbound packet, up to 8966 bytes per RFC 6762 §17). Each unique malformed packet therefore pinned ~9 KB until process exit.</p> <p>Any unauthenticated host on the local link (UDP/5353, `224.0.0.251` / `ff02::fb`) can drive memory growth at line rate; that includes a guest on the same Wi-Fi, a compromised IoT device, or a container on a shared bridge. On memory-constrained deployments (Home Assistant on Raspberry-Pi-class hardware is the canonical victim) sustained traffic trivially OOM-kills the process, and mDNS-dependent features (HomeKit, Chromecast/Matter, AirPlay, printers) degrade or fail.</p> <p>### Patches Fixed in `zeroconf` 0.149.6 ([PR #1717](https://github.com/python-zeroconf/python-zeroconf/pull/1717)). Upgrade to `&gt;= 0.149.6`.</p> <p>### Workarounds There is no in-process workaround; upgrading is the fix. Otherwise, restrict mDNS (UDP/5353) to trusted Layer-2 segments via AP clie…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: zeroconf</p> <p>### Impact `DNSIncoming._log_exception_debug` and the four `QuietLogger` exception-dedup methods stored an unbounded `_seen_logs` dict keyed by `str(sys.exc_info()[1])`. The seven `IncomingDecodeError` messages raised from `_read_name` / `_decode_labels_at_offset` (RFC 6762 §18 name-decoding error paths) all embed `self.source` — the peer&#39;s ephemeral source port, varying per packet — plus byte `offset` and pointer `link`, so every attacker-influenced combination produced a fresh dedup key. The stored value was the full `sys.exc_info()` triple, whose traceback&#39;s frame locals retained `self.data` (the raw inbound packet, up to 8966 bytes per RFC 6762 §17). Each unique malformed packet therefore pinned ~9 KB until process exit.</p> <p>Any unauthenticated host on the local link (UDP/5353, `224.0.0.251` / `ff02::fb`) can drive memory growth at line rate; that includes a guest on the same Wi-Fi, a compromised IoT device, or a container on a shared bridge. On memory-constrained deployments (Home Assistant on Raspberry-Pi-class hardware is the canonical victim) sustained traffic trivially OOM-kills the process, and mDNS-dependent features (HomeKit, Chromecast/Matter, AirPlay, printers) degrade or fail.</p> <p>### Patches Fixed in `zeroconf` 0.149.6 ([PR #1717](https://github.com/python-zeroconf/python-zeroconf/pull/1717)). Upgrade to `&gt;= 0.149.6`.</p> <p>### Workarounds There is no in-process workaround; upgrading is the fix. Otherwise, restrict mDNS (UDP/5353) to trusted Layer-2 segments via AP clie…</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-phvx-9mgw-67r5 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-3437 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: zeroconf</p> <p>### Impact `DNSIncoming._log_exception_debug` and the four `QuietLogger` exception-dedup methods stored an unbounded `_seen_logs` dict keyed by `str(sys.exc_info()[1])`. The seven `IncomingDecodeError` messages raised from `_read_name` / `_decode_labels_at_offset` (RFC 6762 §18 name-decoding error paths) all embed `self.source` — the peer&#39;s ephemeral source port, varying per packet — plus byte `offset` and pointer `link`, so every attacker-influenced combination produced a fresh dedup key. The stored value was the full `sys.exc_info()` triple, whose traceback&#39;s frame locals retained `self.data` (the raw inbound packet, up to 8966 bytes per RFC 6762 §17). Each unique malformed packet therefore pinned ~9 KB until process exit.</p> <p>Any unauthenticated host on the local link (UDP/5353, `224.0.0.251` / `ff02::fb`) can drive memory growth at line rate; that includes a guest on the same Wi-Fi, a compromised IoT device, or a container on a shared bridge. On memory-constrained deployments (Home Assistant on Raspberry-Pi-class hardware is the canonical victim) sustained traffic trivially OOM-kills the process, and mDNS-dependent features (HomeKit, Chromecast/Matter, AirPlay, printers) degrade or fail.</p> <p>### Patches Fixed in `zeroconf` 0.149.6 ([PR #1717](https://github.com/python-zeroconf/python-zeroconf/pull/1717)). Upgrade to `&gt;= 0.149.6`.</p> <p>### Workarounds There is no in-process workaround; upgrading is the fix. Otherwise, restrict mDNS (UDP/5353) to trusted Layer-2 segments via AP clie…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: zeroconf</p> <p>### Impact `DNSIncoming._log_exception_debug` and the four `QuietLogger` exception-dedup methods stored an unbounded `_seen_logs` dict keyed by `str(sys.exc_info()[1])`. The seven `IncomingDecodeError` messages raised from `_read_name` / `_decode_labels_at_offset` (RFC 6762 §18 name-decoding error paths) all embed `self.source` — the peer&#39;s ephemeral source port, varying per packet — plus byte `offset` and pointer `link`, so every attacker-influenced combination produced a fresh dedup key. The stored value was the full `sys.exc_info()` triple, whose traceback&#39;s frame locals retained `self.data` (the raw inbound packet, up to 8966 bytes per RFC 6762 §17). Each unique malformed packet therefore pinned ~9 KB until process exit.</p> <p>Any unauthenticated host on the local link (UDP/5353, `224.0.0.251` / `ff02::fb`) can drive memory growth at line rate; that includes a guest on the same Wi-Fi, a compromised IoT device, or a container on a shared bridge. On memory-constrained deployments (Home Assistant on Raspberry-Pi-class hardware is the canonical victim) sustained traffic trivially OOM-kills the process, and mDNS-dependent features (HomeKit, Chromecast/Matter, AirPlay, printers) degrade or fail.</p> <p>### Patches Fixed in `zeroconf` 0.149.6 ([PR #1717](https://github.com/python-zeroconf/python-zeroconf/pull/1717)). Upgrade to `&gt;= 0.149.6`.</p> <p>### Workarounds There is no in-process workaround; upgrading is the fix. Otherwise, restrict mDNS (UDP/5353) to trusted Layer-2 segments via AP clie…</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-3437