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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 02 Oct 2026 01:14:22 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-32632 — Glances's REST/WebUI Lacks Host Validation and Remains Exposed to DNS Rebinding</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-32632</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; nicolargo glances&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Glances is an open-source system cross-platform monitoring tool. Glances recently added DNS rebinding protection for the MCP endpoint, but prior to version 4.5.2, the main REST/WebUI FastAPI application still accepts arbitrary `Host` headers and does not apply `TrustedHostMiddleware` or an equivalent host allowlist. As a result, the REST API, WebUI, and token endpoint remain reachable through attacker-controlled domains in classic DNS rebinding scenarios. Once the victim browser has rebound the attacker domain to the Glances service, same-origin policy no longer protects the API because the browser considers the rebinding domain to be the origin. This is a distinct issue from the previously reported default CORS weakness. CORS is not required for exploitation here because DNS rebinding causes the victim browser to treat the malicious domain as same-origin with the rebinding target. Version 4.5.2 contains a patch for the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; nicolargo glances&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Glances is an open-source system cross-platform monitoring tool. Glances recently added DNS rebinding protection for the MCP endpoint, but prior to version 4.5.2, the main REST/WebUI FastAPI application still accepts arbitrary `Host` headers and does not apply `TrustedHostMiddleware` or an equivalent host allowlist. As a result, the REST API, WebUI, and token endpoint remain reachable through attacker-controlled domains in classic DNS rebinding scenarios. Once the victim browser has rebound the attacker domain to the Glances service, same-origin policy no longer protects the API because the browser considers the rebinding domain to be the origin. This is a distinct issue from the previously reported default CORS weakness. CORS is not required for exploitation here because DNS rebinding causes the victim browser to treat the malicious domain as same-origin with the rebinding target. Version 4.5.2 contains a patch for the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-32632</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-hhcg-r27j-fhv9 — Glances's REST/WebUI Lacks Host Validation and Remains Exposed to DNS Rebinding</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-hhcg-r27j-fhv9</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: Glances&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Glances recently added DNS rebinding protection for the MCP endpoint, but the main REST/WebUI FastAPI application still accepts arbitrary `Host` headers and does not apply `TrustedHostMiddleware` or an equivalent host allowlist.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;As a result, the REST API, WebUI, and token endpoint remain reachable through attacker-controlled domains in classic DNS rebinding scenarios. Once the victim browser has rebound the attacker domain to the Glances service, same-origin policy no longer protects the API because the browser considers the rebinding domain to be the origin.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is a distinct issue from the previously reported default CORS weakness. CORS is not required for exploitation here because DNS rebinding causes the victim browser to treat the malicious domain as same-origin with the rebinding target.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The MCP endpoint now has explicit host-based transport security:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
# glances/outputs/glances_mcp.py
self.mcp_allowed_hosts = [&amp;#34;localhost&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;127.0.0.1&amp;#34;]
...
return TransportSecuritySettings(
    allowed_hosts=allowed_hosts,
    allowed_origins=allowed_origins,
)
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, the main FastAPI application for REST/WebUI/token routes is initialized without any host validation middleware:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
# glances/outputs/glances_restful_api.py
self._app = FastAPI(default_response_class=GlancesJSONResponse)
...
self._app.add_middleware(
    CORSMiddleware,
    allow_origins=config.get_list_value(&amp;#39;outputs&amp;#39;, &amp;#39;cors_origins&amp;#39;, default=[&amp;#34;*&amp;#34;]),
    allow_credential…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: Glances&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Glances recently added DNS rebinding protection for the MCP endpoint, but the main REST/WebUI FastAPI application still accepts arbitrary `Host` headers and does not apply `TrustedHostMiddleware` or an equivalent host allowlist.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;As a result, the REST API, WebUI, and token endpoint remain reachable through attacker-controlled domains in classic DNS rebinding scenarios. Once the victim browser has rebound the attacker domain to the Glances service, same-origin policy no longer protects the API because the browser considers the rebinding domain to be the origin.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is a distinct issue from the previously reported default CORS weakness. CORS is not required for exploitation here because DNS rebinding causes the victim browser to treat the malicious domain as same-origin with the rebinding target.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The MCP endpoint now has explicit host-based transport security:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
# glances/outputs/glances_mcp.py
self.mcp_allowed_hosts = [&amp;#34;localhost&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;127.0.0.1&amp;#34;]
...
return TransportSecuritySettings(
    allowed_hosts=allowed_hosts,
    allowed_origins=allowed_origins,
)
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, the main FastAPI application for REST/WebUI/token routes is initialized without any host validation middleware:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
# glances/outputs/glances_restful_api.py
self._app = FastAPI(default_response_class=GlancesJSONResponse)
...
self._app.add_middleware(
    CORSMiddleware,
    allow_origins=config.get_list_value(&amp;#39;outputs&amp;#39;, &amp;#39;cors_origins&amp;#39;, default=[&amp;#34;*&amp;#34;]),
    allow_credential…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-hhcg-r27j-fhv9</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>PYSEC-2026-2171</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-2171</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: glances&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Glances is an open-source system cross-platform monitoring tool. Glances recently added DNS rebinding protection for the MCP endpoint, but prior to version 4.5.2, the main REST/WebUI FastAPI application still accepts arbitrary `Host` headers and does not apply `TrustedHostMiddleware` or an equivalent host allowlist. As a result, the REST API, WebUI, and token endpoint remain reachable through attacker-controlled domains in classic DNS rebinding scenarios. Once the victim browser has rebound the attacker domain to the Glances service, same-origin policy no longer protects the API because the browser considers the rebinding domain to be the origin. This is a distinct issue from the previously reported default CORS weakness. CORS is not required for exploitation here because DNS rebinding causes the victim browser to treat the malicious domain as same-origin with the rebinding target. Version 4.5.2 contains a patch for the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: glances&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Glances is an open-source system cross-platform monitoring tool. Glances recently added DNS rebinding protection for the MCP endpoint, but prior to version 4.5.2, the main REST/WebUI FastAPI application still accepts arbitrary `Host` headers and does not apply `TrustedHostMiddleware` or an equivalent host allowlist. As a result, the REST API, WebUI, and token endpoint remain reachable through attacker-controlled domains in classic DNS rebinding scenarios. Once the victim browser has rebound the attacker domain to the Glances service, same-origin policy no longer protects the API because the browser considers the rebinding domain to be the origin. This is a distinct issue from the previously reported default CORS weakness. CORS is not required for exploitation here because DNS rebinding causes the victim browser to treat the malicious domain as same-origin with the rebinding target. Version 4.5.2 contains a patch for the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-2171</guid>
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