<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 28 Sep 2026 18:44:23 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-41205 — Mako: Path traversal via double-slash URI prefix in TemplateLookup</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-41205</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; sqlalchemy mako&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Mako is a template library written in Python. Prior to 1.3.11, TemplateLookup.get_template() is vulnerable to path traversal when a URI starts with // (e.g., //../../../secret.txt). The root cause is an inconsistency between two slash-stripping implementations. Any file readable by the process can be returned as rendered template content when an application passes untrusted input directly to TemplateLookup.get_template(). This vulnerability is fixed in 1.3.11.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; sqlalchemy mako&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Mako is a template library written in Python. Prior to 1.3.11, TemplateLookup.get_template() is vulnerable to path traversal when a URI starts with // (e.g., //../../../secret.txt). The root cause is an inconsistency between two slash-stripping implementations. Any file readable by the process can be returned as rendered template content when an application passes untrusted input directly to TemplateLookup.get_template(). This vulnerability is fixed in 1.3.11.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-41205</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-v92g-xgxw-vvmm — Mako: Path traversal via double-slash URI prefix in TemplateLookup</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-v92g-xgxw-vvmm</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: Mako&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`TemplateLookup.get_template()` is vulnerable to path traversal when a URI starts with `//` (e.g., `//../../../secret.txt`). The root cause is an inconsistency between two slash-stripping implementations:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `Template.__init__` strips **one** leading `/` using `if`/slice
- `TemplateLookup.get_template()` strips **all** leading `/` using `re.sub(r&amp;#34;^\/+&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;&amp;#34;)`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When a URI like `//../../../../etc/passwd` is passed:
1. `get_template()` strips all `/` → `../../../../etc/passwd` → file found via `posixpath.join(dir_, u)`
2. `Template.__init__` strips one `/` → `/../../../../etc/passwd` → `normpath` → `/etc/passwd`
3. `/etc/passwd`.startswith(`..`) → `False` → **check bypassed**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Arbitrary file read: any file readable by the process can be returned as rendered template content when an application passes untrusted input directly to `TemplateLookup.get_template()`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Note: this is exploitable at the library API level. HTTP-based exploitation is mitigated by Python&amp;#39;s `BaseHTTPRequestHandler` which normalizes double-slash prefixes since CPython gh-87389. Applications using other HTTP servers that do not normalize paths may be affected.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Fix&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Changed `Template.__init__` to use `lstrip(&amp;#34;/&amp;#34;)` instead of stripping only a single leading slash, so both code paths handle leading slashes consistently.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: Mako&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`TemplateLookup.get_template()` is vulnerable to path traversal when a URI starts with `//` (e.g., `//../../../secret.txt`). The root cause is an inconsistency between two slash-stripping implementations:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `Template.__init__` strips **one** leading `/` using `if`/slice
- `TemplateLookup.get_template()` strips **all** leading `/` using `re.sub(r&amp;#34;^\/+&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;&amp;#34;)`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When a URI like `//../../../../etc/passwd` is passed:
1. `get_template()` strips all `/` → `../../../../etc/passwd` → file found via `posixpath.join(dir_, u)`
2. `Template.__init__` strips one `/` → `/../../../../etc/passwd` → `normpath` → `/etc/passwd`
3. `/etc/passwd`.startswith(`..`) → `False` → **check bypassed**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Arbitrary file read: any file readable by the process can be returned as rendered template content when an application passes untrusted input directly to `TemplateLookup.get_template()`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Note: this is exploitable at the library API level. HTTP-based exploitation is mitigated by Python&amp;#39;s `BaseHTTPRequestHandler` which normalizes double-slash prefixes since CPython gh-87389. Applications using other HTTP servers that do not normalize paths may be affected.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Fix&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Changed `Template.__init__` to use `lstrip(&amp;#34;/&amp;#34;)` instead of stripping only a single leading slash, so both code paths handle leading slashes consistently.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-v92g-xgxw-vvmm</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>PYSEC-2026-88</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-88</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: mako&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Mako is a template library written in Python. Prior to 1.3.11, TemplateLookup.get_template() is vulnerable to path traversal when a URI starts with // (e.g., //../../../secret.txt). The root cause is an inconsistency between two slash-stripping implementations. Any file readable by the process can be returned as rendered template content when an application passes untrusted input directly to TemplateLookup.get_template(). This vulnerability is fixed in 1.3.11.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: mako&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Mako is a template library written in Python. Prior to 1.3.11, TemplateLookup.get_template() is vulnerable to path traversal when a URI starts with // (e.g., //../../../secret.txt). The root cause is an inconsistency between two slash-stripping implementations. Any file readable by the process can be returned as rendered template content when an application passes untrusted input directly to TemplateLookup.get_template(). This vulnerability is fixed in 1.3.11.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-88</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
