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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 05:33:39 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-28684 — python-dotenv: Symlink following in set_key allows arbitrary file overwrite via cross-device rename fallback</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-28684</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; theskumar python-dotenv&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;python-dotenv reads key-value pairs from a .env file and can set them as environment variables. Prior to version 1.2.2, `set_key()` and `unset_key()` in python-dotenv follow symbolic links when rewriting `.env` files, allowing a local attacker to overwrite arbitrary files via a crafted symlink when a cross-device rename fallback is triggered. Users should upgrade to v.1.2.2 or, as a workaround, apply the patch manually.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; theskumar python-dotenv&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;python-dotenv reads key-value pairs from a .env file and can set them as environment variables. Prior to version 1.2.2, `set_key()` and `unset_key()` in python-dotenv follow symbolic links when rewriting `.env` files, allowing a local attacker to overwrite arbitrary files via a crafted symlink when a cross-device rename fallback is triggered. Users should upgrade to v.1.2.2 or, as a workaround, apply the patch manually.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-28684</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-mf9w-mj56-hr94 — python-dotenv: Symlink following in set_key allows arbitrary file overwrite via cross-device rename fallback</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-mf9w-mj56-hr94</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: python-dotenv&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`set_key()` and `unset_key()` in python-dotenv follow symbolic links when rewriting `.env` files, allowing a local attacker to overwrite arbitrary files via a crafted symlink when a cross-device rename fallback is triggered.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `rewrite()` context manager in `dotenv/main.py` is used by both `set_key()` and `unset_key()` to safely modify `.env` files. It works by writing to a temporary file (created in the system&amp;#39;s default temp directory, typically `/tmp`) and then using `shutil.move()` to replace the original file.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When the `.env` path is a symbolic link and the temp directory resides on a different filesystem than the target (a common configuration on Linux systems using tmpfs for `/tmp`), the following sequence occurs:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. `shutil.move()` first attempts `os.rename()`, which fails with an `OSError` because atomic renames cannot cross device boundaries.
2. On failure, `shutil.move()` falls back to `shutil.copy2()` followed by `os.unlink()`.
3. `shutil.copy2()` calls `shutil.copyfile()` with `follow_symlinks=True` by default.
4. This causes the content to be written to the **symlink target** rather than replacing the symlink itself.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker who has write access to the directory containing a `.env` file can pre-place a symlink pointing to any file that the application process has write access to. When the application (or a privileged process such as a deploy script, Docker entrypoint, or CI pipeline) calls `set_key()` or `unset_key()`, the sy…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: python-dotenv&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`set_key()` and `unset_key()` in python-dotenv follow symbolic links when rewriting `.env` files, allowing a local attacker to overwrite arbitrary files via a crafted symlink when a cross-device rename fallback is triggered.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `rewrite()` context manager in `dotenv/main.py` is used by both `set_key()` and `unset_key()` to safely modify `.env` files. It works by writing to a temporary file (created in the system&amp;#39;s default temp directory, typically `/tmp`) and then using `shutil.move()` to replace the original file.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When the `.env` path is a symbolic link and the temp directory resides on a different filesystem than the target (a common configuration on Linux systems using tmpfs for `/tmp`), the following sequence occurs:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. `shutil.move()` first attempts `os.rename()`, which fails with an `OSError` because atomic renames cannot cross device boundaries.
2. On failure, `shutil.move()` falls back to `shutil.copy2()` followed by `os.unlink()`.
3. `shutil.copy2()` calls `shutil.copyfile()` with `follow_symlinks=True` by default.
4. This causes the content to be written to the **symlink target** rather than replacing the symlink itself.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker who has write access to the directory containing a `.env` file can pre-place a symlink pointing to any file that the application process has write access to. When the application (or a privileged process such as a deploy script, Docker entrypoint, or CI pipeline) calls `set_key()` or `unset_key()`, the sy…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-mf9w-mj56-hr94</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>PYSEC-2026-2270</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-2270</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: python-dotenv&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;python-dotenv reads key-value pairs from a .env file and can set them as environment variables. Prior to version 1.2.2, `set_key()` and `unset_key()` in python-dotenv follow symbolic links when rewriting `.env` files, allowing a local attacker to overwrite arbitrary files via a crafted symlink when a cross-device rename fallback is triggered. Users should upgrade to v.1.2.2 or, as a workaround, apply the patch manually.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: python-dotenv&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;python-dotenv reads key-value pairs from a .env file and can set them as environment variables. Prior to version 1.2.2, `set_key()` and `unset_key()` in python-dotenv follow symbolic links when rewriting `.env` files, allowing a local attacker to overwrite arbitrary files via a crafted symlink when a cross-device rename fallback is triggered. Users should upgrade to v.1.2.2 or, as a workaround, apply the patch manually.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-2270</guid>
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