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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 05 Oct 2026 15:26:51 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-68432 — vxlan: require CAP_NET_ADMIN in the device netns for changelink</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-68432</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;vxlan: require CAP_NET_ADMIN in the device netns for changelink&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A tunnel changelink() operates on at most two netns, dev_net(dev) and
the sticky underlay netns vxlan-&amp;gt;net. They differ once the device is
created in or moved to a netns other than the one the request runs in.
The rtnl changelink path checks CAP_NET_ADMIN only against dev_net(dev),
so a caller privileged there but not in vxlan-&amp;gt;net can rewrite a vxlan
device whose underlay lives in vxlan-&amp;gt;net.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;vxlan_changelink() validates and applies the new configuration against
vxlan-&amp;gt;net (vxlan_config_validate(vxlan-&amp;gt;net, ...)) and can reopen the
underlay socket in that netns, so the same reasoning as the tunnel
changelink series applies here.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Gate vxlan_changelink() with rtnl_dev_link_net_capable(), at the top of
the op before any attribute is parsed, matching ipgre_changelink() and
the rest of the &amp;#34;require CAP_NET_ADMIN in the device netns for
changelink&amp;#34; series.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai).&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;vxlan: require CAP_NET_ADMIN in the device netns for changelink&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A tunnel changelink() operates on at most two netns, dev_net(dev) and
the sticky underlay netns vxlan-&amp;gt;net. They differ once the device is
created in or moved to a netns other than the one the request runs in.
The rtnl changelink path checks CAP_NET_ADMIN only against dev_net(dev),
so a caller privileged there but not in vxlan-&amp;gt;net can rewrite a vxlan
device whose underlay lives in vxlan-&amp;gt;net.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;vxlan_changelink() validates and applies the new configuration against
vxlan-&amp;gt;net (vxlan_config_validate(vxlan-&amp;gt;net, ...)) and can reopen the
underlay socket in that netns, so the same reasoning as the tunnel
changelink series applies here.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Gate vxlan_changelink() with rtnl_dev_link_net_capable(), at the top of
the op before any attribute is parsed, matching ipgre_changelink() and
the rest of the &amp;#34;require CAP_NET_ADMIN in the device netns for
changelink&amp;#34; series.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai).&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-68432</guid>
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