CVE-2026-68082 — libceph: fix two unsafe bare decodes in decode_lockers()

Affected: Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

libceph: fix two unsafe bare decodes in decode_lockers()

decode_lockers() in cls_lock_client.c contains two bare decode operations that allow a malicious or compromised OSD to trigger slab-out-of-bounds reads:

1. ceph_decode_32(p) at the num_lockers field has no preceding bounds check. ceph_start_decoding() accepts struct_len=0 as valid -- the internal ceph_decode_need(p, end, 0, bad) always passes -- so when an OSD sends struct_len=0, ceph_start_decoding() returns success with p == end. The immediately following bare ceph_decode_32(p) then reads 4 bytes past the validated buffer boundary. The garbage value is passed directly to kzalloc_objs() as the locker count.

The sibling function decode_watchers() in osd_client.c already uses ceph_decode_32_safe() after its own ceph_start_decoding() call. decode_lockers() was the only site using the bare variant.

2. ceph_decode_8(p) after the decode_locker() loop has no preceding bounds check. If an OSD crafts num_lockers such that the loop advances p exactly to end, the subsequent bare ceph_decode_8(p) reads one byte past the validated buffer boundary. The result is passed directly into *type, which is used as a lock type discriminator by callers, giving an OSD-controlled one-byte OOB read with direct influence over the lock type field.

Fix both by replacing bare operations with their safe variants: ceph_decode_32(p)…

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CVE-2026-68082 — libceph: fix two unsafe bare decodes in decode_lockers()