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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 05 Oct 2026 19:48:50 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-65979 — OpenEXR: Out-of-bounds read in HTJ2K decoder from unvalidated chunk header length (PLEN)</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-65979</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; AcademySoftwareFoundation openexr&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;OpenEXR is the reference implementation and specification for the EXR image format, widely used in the motion picture industry. From version 3.4.0 through 3.4.12, the HTJ2K decoder parses a header-length field (PLEN) from a chunk&amp;#39;s compressed data but never checks that this value fits within the available buffer before using it. When decoding, it advances the codestream pointer by the attacker-supplied header size and passes the resulting offset and remaining length to the OpenJPH memory-input path, so a crafted value pushes the pointer past the end of the buffer and causes an out-of-bounds read. Because this field comes straight from attacker-controlled EXR chunk data, the flaw is reachable during normal decoding of an untrusted file. This issue is fixed in version 3.4.13.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; AcademySoftwareFoundation openexr&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;OpenEXR is the reference implementation and specification for the EXR image format, widely used in the motion picture industry. From version 3.4.0 through 3.4.12, the HTJ2K decoder parses a header-length field (PLEN) from a chunk&amp;#39;s compressed data but never checks that this value fits within the available buffer before using it. When decoding, it advances the codestream pointer by the attacker-supplied header size and passes the resulting offset and remaining length to the OpenJPH memory-input path, so a crafted value pushes the pointer past the end of the buffer and causes an out-of-bounds read. Because this field comes straight from attacker-controlled EXR chunk data, the flaw is reachable during normal decoding of an untrusted file. This issue is fixed in version 3.4.13.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-65979</guid>
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