<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Sun, 04 Oct 2026 03:52:40 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-64308 — crypto: ccp - Do not initialize SNP for ioctl(SNP_VLEK_LOAD)</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-64308</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;crypto: ccp - Do not initialize SNP for ioctl(SNP_VLEK_LOAD)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Sashiko notes:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;gt; if SEV initialization fails and KVM is actively running normal VMs, could a
&amp;gt; userspace process trigger this code path via /dev/sev ioctls (e.g.,
&amp;gt; SEV_PDH_GEN) and zero out MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA globally? Would the next VMRUN
&amp;gt; execution for an active VM trigger a general protection fault and crash the
&amp;gt; host?&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The SEV firmware docs for SNP_VLEK_LOAD note:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;gt; On SNP_SHUTDOWN, the VLEK is deleted.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;That is, the initialization/shutdown wrapper here is pointless, because the
firmware immediately throws away the key anyway. Instead, refuse to do
anything if SNP has not been previously initialized.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is an ABI break: before, this was a no-op and almost certainly a
mistake by userspace, and now it returns -ENODEV. ABI compatibility could be
maintained here by simply returning 0 in the check instead.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;crypto: ccp - Do not initialize SNP for ioctl(SNP_VLEK_LOAD)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Sashiko notes:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;gt; if SEV initialization fails and KVM is actively running normal VMs, could a
&amp;gt; userspace process trigger this code path via /dev/sev ioctls (e.g.,
&amp;gt; SEV_PDH_GEN) and zero out MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA globally? Would the next VMRUN
&amp;gt; execution for an active VM trigger a general protection fault and crash the
&amp;gt; host?&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The SEV firmware docs for SNP_VLEK_LOAD note:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;gt; On SNP_SHUTDOWN, the VLEK is deleted.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;That is, the initialization/shutdown wrapper here is pointless, because the
firmware immediately throws away the key anyway. Instead, refuse to do
anything if SNP has not been previously initialized.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is an ABI break: before, this was a no-op and almost certainly a
mistake by userspace, and now it returns -ENODEV. ABI compatibility could be
maintained here by simply returning 0 in the check instead.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-64308</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
