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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sun, 04 Oct 2026 04:20:02 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-64307 — crypto: ccp - Do not initialize SNP for ioctl(SNP_CONFIG)</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-64307</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;crypto: ccp - Do not initialize SNP for ioctl(SNP_CONFIG)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Sashiko notes:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;gt; if SEV initialization fails and KVM is actively running normal VMs, could a
&amp;gt; userspace process trigger this code path via /dev/sev ioctls (e.g.,
&amp;gt; SEV_PDH_GEN) and zero out MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA globally? Would the next VMRUN
&amp;gt; execution for an active VM trigger a general protection fault and crash the
&amp;gt; host?&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Refuse to re-try initialization if SNP is not already initialized for
SNP_CONFIG.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is technically an ABI break: before if SNP initialization failed it
could be transparently retriggered by this ioctl, and if no VMs were
running, everything worked fine. Hopefully this is enough of a corner case
that nobody will notice, but someone does, there are a few options:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;* do something like symbol_get() for kvm and refuse to initialize if KVM is
  loaded
* check each cpu&amp;#39;s HSAVE_PA for non-zero data before re-initializing
* once initialization has failed, continue to refuse to initialize until
  the ccp module is unloaded&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;crypto: ccp - Do not initialize SNP for ioctl(SNP_CONFIG)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Sashiko notes:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;gt; if SEV initialization fails and KVM is actively running normal VMs, could a
&amp;gt; userspace process trigger this code path via /dev/sev ioctls (e.g.,
&amp;gt; SEV_PDH_GEN) and zero out MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA globally? Would the next VMRUN
&amp;gt; execution for an active VM trigger a general protection fault and crash the
&amp;gt; host?&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Refuse to re-try initialization if SNP is not already initialized for
SNP_CONFIG.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is technically an ABI break: before if SNP initialization failed it
could be transparently retriggered by this ioctl, and if no VMs were
running, everything worked fine. Hopefully this is enough of a corner case
that nobody will notice, but someone does, there are a few options:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;* do something like symbol_get() for kvm and refuse to initialize if KVM is
  loaded
* check each cpu&amp;#39;s HSAVE_PA for non-zero data before re-initializing
* once initialization has failed, continue to refuse to initialize until
  the ccp module is unloaded&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-64307</guid>
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