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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2026 16:41:21 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-64296 — exfat: bound uniname advance in exfat_find_dir_entry()</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-64296</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;exfat: bound uniname advance in exfat_find_dir_entry()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In exfat_find_dir_entry(), each TYPE_EXTEND (file name) entry advances the
output pointer by a fixed amount while the loop guard only tracks the
accumulated name length:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if (++order == 2)
		uniname = p_uniname-&amp;gt;name;
	else
		uniname += EXFAT_FILE_NAME_LEN;
	len = exfat_extract_uni_name(ep, entry_uniname);
	name_len += len;
	unichar = *(uniname+len);
	*(uniname+len) = 0x0;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;uniname grows by EXFAT_FILE_NAME_LEN (15) per name entry, but name_len
grows only by the actual extracted length, which is shorter when a name
fragment contains an early NUL.  The only guard is
`name_len &amp;gt;= MAX_NAME_LENGTH`, so a crafted directory with many short
name fragments lets uniname run far past the
p_uniname-&amp;gt;name[MAX_NAME_LENGTH + 3] buffer while name_len stays small,
causing an out-of-bounds read and write at *(uniname+len).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The sibling extractor exfat_get_uniname_from_ext_entry() already stops
on a short fragment (the lockstep `len != EXFAT_FILE_NAME_LEN` guard
added in commit d42334578eba (&amp;#34;exfat: check if filename entries exceeds
max filename length&amp;#34;)); exfat_find_dir_entry() never got the
equivalent.  Track the per-entry write offset as a count and reject a
fragment once the offset, or the offset plus the extracted length, would
exceed MAX_NAME_LENGTH, before forming the output pointer.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;exfat: bound uniname advance in exfat_find_dir_entry()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In exfat_find_dir_entry(), each TYPE_EXTEND (file name) entry advances the
output pointer by a fixed amount while the loop guard only tracks the
accumulated name length:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if (++order == 2)
		uniname = p_uniname-&amp;gt;name;
	else
		uniname += EXFAT_FILE_NAME_LEN;
	len = exfat_extract_uni_name(ep, entry_uniname);
	name_len += len;
	unichar = *(uniname+len);
	*(uniname+len) = 0x0;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;uniname grows by EXFAT_FILE_NAME_LEN (15) per name entry, but name_len
grows only by the actual extracted length, which is shorter when a name
fragment contains an early NUL.  The only guard is
`name_len &amp;gt;= MAX_NAME_LENGTH`, so a crafted directory with many short
name fragments lets uniname run far past the
p_uniname-&amp;gt;name[MAX_NAME_LENGTH + 3] buffer while name_len stays small,
causing an out-of-bounds read and write at *(uniname+len).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The sibling extractor exfat_get_uniname_from_ext_entry() already stops
on a short fragment (the lockstep `len != EXFAT_FILE_NAME_LEN` guard
added in commit d42334578eba (&amp;#34;exfat: check if filename entries exceeds
max filename length&amp;#34;)); exfat_find_dir_entry() never got the
equivalent.  Track the per-entry write offset as a count and reject a
fragment once the offset, or the offset plus the extracted length, would
exceed MAX_NAME_LENGTH, before forming the output pointer.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-64296</guid>
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