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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Thu, 01 Oct 2026 19:33:35 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-64259 — fuse-uring: make a fuse_req on SQE commit only findable after memcpy</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-64259</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;fuse-uring: make a fuse_req on SQE commit only findable after memcpy&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Bad userspace might try to trick us and send commit SQEs request
unique / commit-id of requests that are not even send to
fuse-server (io_uring_cmd_done() not called) yet.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;fuse_uring_commit_fetch() ends the fuse request when the ring entry
has a wrong state, but that could have caused a use-after-free
with the memcpy operations in fuse_uring_send_in_task().
In order to avoid such races the call of fuse_uring_add_to_pq()
is moved after the copy operations and just before completing
the io-uring request - malicious userspace cannot find the request
anymore until all prepration work in fuse-client/kernel is completed.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This also moves fuse_uring_add_to_pq() a bit up in the code to
avoid a forward declaration. Also not with a preparation commit,
to make it easier to back port to older kernels.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;fuse-uring: make a fuse_req on SQE commit only findable after memcpy&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Bad userspace might try to trick us and send commit SQEs request
unique / commit-id of requests that are not even send to
fuse-server (io_uring_cmd_done() not called) yet.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;fuse_uring_commit_fetch() ends the fuse request when the ring entry
has a wrong state, but that could have caused a use-after-free
with the memcpy operations in fuse_uring_send_in_task().
In order to avoid such races the call of fuse_uring_add_to_pq()
is moved after the copy operations and just before completing
the io-uring request - malicious userspace cannot find the request
anymore until all prepration work in fuse-client/kernel is completed.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This also moves fuse_uring_add_to_pq() a bit up in the code to
avoid a forward declaration. Also not with a preparation commit,
to make it easier to back port to older kernels.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-64259</guid>
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