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    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Thu, 01 Oct 2026 20:31:28 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-64085 — hwmon: (pmbus/adm1266) bounce blackbox records through a protocol-sized buffer</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-64085</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;hwmon: (pmbus/adm1266) bounce blackbox records through a protocol-sized buffer&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;adm1266_pmbus_block_xfer() copies the device-supplied block payload
into the caller-provided buffer using the device-supplied length:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;memcpy(data_r, &amp;amp;msgs[1].buf[1], msgs[1].buf[0]);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The helper does not know how large data_r is and trusts the device to
return at most one record&amp;#39;s worth of bytes.  adm1266_nvmem_read_blackbox()
violates that contract: it advances read_buff inside data-&amp;gt;dev_mem in
ADM1266_BLACKBOX_SIZE (64-byte) strides while the helper is willing to
write up to ADM1266_PMBUS_BLOCK_MAX (255) bytes.  A device that returns
more than 64 bytes on the trailing record (read_buff offset 1984 in
the 2048-byte dev_mem allocation) overflows dev_mem by up to 191 bytes
before the post-call&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if (ret != ADM1266_BLACKBOX_SIZE)
		return -EIO;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;can reject the response.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Contain the fix in the caller without changing the helper signature:
read each record into a 255-byte local bounce buffer that matches the
helper&amp;#39;s maximum output, validate the returned length, and only then
copy exactly ADM1266_BLACKBOX_SIZE bytes into the dev_mem slot.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;hwmon: (pmbus/adm1266) bounce blackbox records through a protocol-sized buffer&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;adm1266_pmbus_block_xfer() copies the device-supplied block payload
into the caller-provided buffer using the device-supplied length:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;memcpy(data_r, &amp;amp;msgs[1].buf[1], msgs[1].buf[0]);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The helper does not know how large data_r is and trusts the device to
return at most one record&amp;#39;s worth of bytes.  adm1266_nvmem_read_blackbox()
violates that contract: it advances read_buff inside data-&amp;gt;dev_mem in
ADM1266_BLACKBOX_SIZE (64-byte) strides while the helper is willing to
write up to ADM1266_PMBUS_BLOCK_MAX (255) bytes.  A device that returns
more than 64 bytes on the trailing record (read_buff offset 1984 in
the 2048-byte dev_mem allocation) overflows dev_mem by up to 191 bytes
before the post-call&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if (ret != ADM1266_BLACKBOX_SIZE)
		return -EIO;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;can reject the response.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Contain the fix in the caller without changing the helper signature:
read each record into a 255-byte local bounce buffer that matches the
helper&amp;#39;s maximum output, validate the returned length, and only then
copy exactly ADM1266_BLACKBOX_SIZE bytes into the dev_mem slot.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-64085</guid>
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