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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 02 Oct 2026 01:13:15 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-64083 — hwmon: (pmbus/adm1266) reject short block-read responses in the GPIO accessors</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-64083</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;hwmon: (pmbus/adm1266) reject short block-read responses in the GPIO accessors&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;adm1266_gpio_get() and adm1266_gpio_get_multiple() both compose the
pin-status word as&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;pins_status = read_buf[0] + (read_buf[1] &amp;lt;&amp;lt; 8);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;right after i2c_smbus_read_block_data(), guarding only against an
error return.  A well-behaved device returns 2 bytes for
GPIO_STATUS/PDIO_STATUS, but the helper happily reports a 0- or
1-byte response too.  If the device returns 0 bytes, both read_buf
slots are uninitialized stack memory; if it returns 1 byte, read_buf[1]
is.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The composed value then flows through set_bit() into the caller&amp;#39;s
*bits in adm1266_gpio_get_multiple(), or into the return value of
adm1266_gpio_get(), and ends up in userspace via gpiolib (sysfs and
the char-dev ioctls).  That leaks a few bits of kernel stack per
request on any device whose firmware glitch, bus error, or hostile
slave produces a short block-read response.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Add the missing length check to both call sites and surface a short
response as -EIO.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;hwmon: (pmbus/adm1266) reject short block-read responses in the GPIO accessors&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;adm1266_gpio_get() and adm1266_gpio_get_multiple() both compose the
pin-status word as&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;pins_status = read_buf[0] + (read_buf[1] &amp;lt;&amp;lt; 8);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;right after i2c_smbus_read_block_data(), guarding only against an
error return.  A well-behaved device returns 2 bytes for
GPIO_STATUS/PDIO_STATUS, but the helper happily reports a 0- or
1-byte response too.  If the device returns 0 bytes, both read_buf
slots are uninitialized stack memory; if it returns 1 byte, read_buf[1]
is.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The composed value then flows through set_bit() into the caller&amp;#39;s
*bits in adm1266_gpio_get_multiple(), or into the return value of
adm1266_gpio_get(), and ends up in userspace via gpiolib (sysfs and
the char-dev ioctls).  That leaks a few bits of kernel stack per
request on any device whose firmware glitch, bus error, or hostile
slave produces a short block-read response.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Add the missing length check to both call sites and surface a short
response as -EIO.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-64083</guid>
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