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    <lastBuildDate>Sun, 04 Oct 2026 08:45:49 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-64082 — riscv: Fix register corruption from uninitialized cregs on error</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-64082</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;riscv: Fix register corruption from uninitialized cregs on error&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;compat_riscv_gpr_set() calls cregs_to_regs() unconditionally, even when
user_regset_copyin() fails. Since cregs is an uninitialized stack
variable, a copyin failure causes uninitialized stack data to be written
into the target task&amp;#39;s pt_regs, corrupting its register state and
potentially leaking kernel stack contents.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;compat_restore_sigcontext() has the same issue: it calls cregs_to_regs()
even when __copy_from_user() fails, leading to the same corruption of
the signal-returning task&amp;#39;s register state on error.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Only call cregs_to_regs() when the user copy succeeds.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;riscv: Fix register corruption from uninitialized cregs on error&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;compat_riscv_gpr_set() calls cregs_to_regs() unconditionally, even when
user_regset_copyin() fails. Since cregs is an uninitialized stack
variable, a copyin failure causes uninitialized stack data to be written
into the target task&amp;#39;s pt_regs, corrupting its register state and
potentially leaking kernel stack contents.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;compat_restore_sigcontext() has the same issue: it calls cregs_to_regs()
even when __copy_from_user() fails, leading to the same corruption of
the signal-returning task&amp;#39;s register state on error.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Only call cregs_to_regs() when the user copy succeeds.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-64082</guid>
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