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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Thu, 01 Oct 2026 20:16:22 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-53345 — KVM: Don't WARN if memory is dirtied without a vCPU when the VM is dying</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-53345</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;KVM: Don&amp;#39;t WARN if memory is dirtied without a vCPU when the VM is dying&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When marking a page dirty, complain about not having a running/loaded vCPU
if and only if the VM is still alive, i.e. its refcount is non-zero.  This
will allow fixing a memory leak for x86 SEV-ES guests without hitting what
is effectively a false positive on the WARN.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For some SEV-ES VM-Exits, KVM keeps a writable mapping of a guest page
across an exit to userspace, and typically unmaps the page on the next
KVM_RUN.  But if userspace never calls KVM_RUN after such an exit, then KVM
needs to unmap the page when the vCPU is destroyed, which in turn triggers
the WARN about not having a running vCPU.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Alternatively, SEV-ES could temporarily load the vCPU to suppress the WARN,
as is done in nested_vmx_free_vcpu() (but for completely unrelated reasons;
suppressing WARN from nested_put_vmcs12_pages() is pure happenstance).  But
loading a vCPU during destruction is gross (ideally nVMX code would be
cleaned up), risks complicating the SEV-ES code (KVM would need to ensure
the temporarily load()+put() only runs when the vCPU isn&amp;#39;t already loaded),
and is ultimately pointless.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The motivation for the WARN is to guard against KVM dirtying guest memory
without pushing the corresponding GFN to the active vCPU&amp;#39;s dirty ring, e.g.
to ensure userspace doesn&amp;#39;t miss a dirty page.  But for the VM&amp;#39;s refcount
to reach zero, there can&amp;#39;t be _any_ userspace…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;KVM: Don&amp;#39;t WARN if memory is dirtied without a vCPU when the VM is dying&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When marking a page dirty, complain about not having a running/loaded vCPU
if and only if the VM is still alive, i.e. its refcount is non-zero.  This
will allow fixing a memory leak for x86 SEV-ES guests without hitting what
is effectively a false positive on the WARN.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For some SEV-ES VM-Exits, KVM keeps a writable mapping of a guest page
across an exit to userspace, and typically unmaps the page on the next
KVM_RUN.  But if userspace never calls KVM_RUN after such an exit, then KVM
needs to unmap the page when the vCPU is destroyed, which in turn triggers
the WARN about not having a running vCPU.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Alternatively, SEV-ES could temporarily load the vCPU to suppress the WARN,
as is done in nested_vmx_free_vcpu() (but for completely unrelated reasons;
suppressing WARN from nested_put_vmcs12_pages() is pure happenstance).  But
loading a vCPU during destruction is gross (ideally nVMX code would be
cleaned up), risks complicating the SEV-ES code (KVM would need to ensure
the temporarily load()+put() only runs when the vCPU isn&amp;#39;t already loaded),
and is ultimately pointless.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The motivation for the WARN is to guard against KVM dirtying guest memory
without pushing the corresponding GFN to the active vCPU&amp;#39;s dirty ring, e.g.
to ensure userspace doesn&amp;#39;t miss a dirty page.  But for the VM&amp;#39;s refcount
to reach zero, there can&amp;#39;t be _any_ userspace…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-53345</guid>
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