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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 21:28:41 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-53136 — drm/amd/display: Clamp VBIOS HDMI retimer register count to array size</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-53136</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;drm/amd/display: Clamp VBIOS HDMI retimer register count to array size&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;[Why &amp;amp; How]
The VBIOS integrated info tables (v1_11 and v2_1) contain HdmiRegNum and
Hdmi6GRegNum fields that are used as loop bounds when copying retimer I2C
register settings into fixed-size arrays (dp*_ext_hdmi_reg_settings[9]
and dp*_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_settings[3]). These u8 fields are not validated
before use, so a malformed VBIOS can specify values up to 255, causing an
out-of-bounds heap write during driver probe.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Clamp each register count to the destination array size using min_t()
before the copy loops, in both get_integrated_info_v11() and
get_integrated_info_v2_1().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;(cherry picked from commit 5a7f0ef90195940c54b0f5bb85b87da55f038c69)&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;drm/amd/display: Clamp VBIOS HDMI retimer register count to array size&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;[Why &amp;amp; How]
The VBIOS integrated info tables (v1_11 and v2_1) contain HdmiRegNum and
Hdmi6GRegNum fields that are used as loop bounds when copying retimer I2C
register settings into fixed-size arrays (dp*_ext_hdmi_reg_settings[9]
and dp*_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_settings[3]). These u8 fields are not validated
before use, so a malformed VBIOS can specify values up to 255, causing an
out-of-bounds heap write during driver probe.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Clamp each register count to the destination array size using min_t()
before the copy loops, in both get_integrated_info_v11() and
get_integrated_info_v2_1().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;(cherry picked from commit 5a7f0ef90195940c54b0f5bb85b87da55f038c69)&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-53136</guid>
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