<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Thu, 08 Oct 2026 13:32:01 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-46114 — RDMA/rxe: Reject non-8-byte ATOMIC_WRITE payloads</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-46114</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;RDMA/rxe: Reject non-8-byte ATOMIC_WRITE payloads&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;atomic_write_reply() at drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_resp.c
unconditionally dereferences 8 bytes at payload_addr(pkt):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;value = *(u64 *)payload_addr(pkt);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;check_rkey() previously accepted an ATOMIC_WRITE request with pktlen ==
resid == 0 because the length validation only compared pktlen against
resid. A remote initiator that sets the RETH length to 0 therefore reaches
atomic_write_reply() with a zero-byte logical payload, and the responder
reads sizeof(u64) bytes from past the logical end of the packet into
skb-&amp;gt;head tailroom, then writes those 8 bytes into the attacker&amp;#39;s MR via
rxe_mr_do_atomic_write(). That is a remote disclosure of 4 bytes of kernel
tailroom per probe (the other 4 bytes are the packet&amp;#39;s own trailing ICRC).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;IBA oA19-28 defines ATOMIC_WRITE as exactly 8 bytes. Anything else is
protocol-invalid. Hoist a strict length check into check_rkey() so the
responder never reaches the unchecked dereference, and keep the existing
WRITE-family length logic for the normal RDMA WRITE path.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reproduced on mainline with an unmodified rxe driver: a sustained
zero-length ATOMIC_WRITE probe repeatedly leaks adjacent skb head-buffer
bytes into the attacker&amp;#39;s MR, including recognisable kernel strings and
partial kernel-direct-map pointer words.  With this patch applied the
responder rejects the PDU and the MR stays all-zero.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;RDMA/rxe: Reject non-8-byte ATOMIC_WRITE payloads&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;atomic_write_reply() at drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_resp.c
unconditionally dereferences 8 bytes at payload_addr(pkt):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;value = *(u64 *)payload_addr(pkt);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;check_rkey() previously accepted an ATOMIC_WRITE request with pktlen ==
resid == 0 because the length validation only compared pktlen against
resid. A remote initiator that sets the RETH length to 0 therefore reaches
atomic_write_reply() with a zero-byte logical payload, and the responder
reads sizeof(u64) bytes from past the logical end of the packet into
skb-&amp;gt;head tailroom, then writes those 8 bytes into the attacker&amp;#39;s MR via
rxe_mr_do_atomic_write(). That is a remote disclosure of 4 bytes of kernel
tailroom per probe (the other 4 bytes are the packet&amp;#39;s own trailing ICRC).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;IBA oA19-28 defines ATOMIC_WRITE as exactly 8 bytes. Anything else is
protocol-invalid. Hoist a strict length check into check_rkey() so the
responder never reaches the unchecked dereference, and keep the existing
WRITE-family length logic for the normal RDMA WRITE path.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reproduced on mainline with an unmodified rxe driver: a sustained
zero-length ATOMIC_WRITE probe repeatedly leaks adjacent skb head-buffer
bytes into the attacker&amp;#39;s MR, including recognisable kernel strings and
partial kernel-direct-map pointer words.  With this patch applied the
responder rejects the PDU and the MR stays all-zero.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-46114</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
