<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2026 16:40:01 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-41567 — Docker: `PUT /containers/{id}/archive` executes container binary on the host</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-41567</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; moby/v2/daemon, moby Docker Engine, docker/daemon, Red Hat Multicluster Global Hub 1.4.5, Red Hat Multicluster Global Hub 1.6.5, Red Hat OpenShift Developer Tools and Services 1.6.3, Red Hat multicluster global hub 1.5.3, Red Hat Openshift Data Foundation 4.22, Red Hat Exploit Intelligence, Red Hat Multicluster Engine for Kubernetes and 12 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Moby is an open source container framework. In versions prior to 29.5.1 and in moby/moby v2 prior to v2.0.0-beta.14, when a compressed archive is uploaded to a container via `PUT /containers/{id}/archive` or piped through `docker cp -`, the daemon resolves decompression binaries (such as `xz` or `unpigz`) from the container&amp;#39;s filesystem rather than the host&amp;#39;s due to incorrect ordering of operations. A malicious container image containing a trojanized decompression binary can achieve arbitrary code execution with full daemon privileges, including host root UID and unrestricted capabilities, when a user uploads a compressed (xz or gzip) archive into that container. This issue is fixed in Docker Engine 29.5.1 and moby/moby v2.0.0-beta.14. Workarounds include only running containers from trusted images, using authorization plugins to restrict access to the `PUT /containers/{id}/archive` endpoint, and avoiding piping compressed archives into containers created from untrusted images&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; moby/v2/daemon, moby Docker Engine, docker/daemon, Red Hat Multicluster Global Hub 1.4.5, Red Hat Multicluster Global Hub 1.6.5, Red Hat OpenShift Developer Tools and Services 1.6.3, Red Hat multicluster global hub 1.5.3, Red Hat Openshift Data Foundation 4.22, Red Hat Exploit Intelligence, Red Hat Multicluster Engine for Kubernetes and 12 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Moby is an open source container framework. In versions prior to 29.5.1 and in moby/moby v2 prior to v2.0.0-beta.14, when a compressed archive is uploaded to a container via `PUT /containers/{id}/archive` or piped through `docker cp -`, the daemon resolves decompression binaries (such as `xz` or `unpigz`) from the container&amp;#39;s filesystem rather than the host&amp;#39;s due to incorrect ordering of operations. A malicious container image containing a trojanized decompression binary can achieve arbitrary code execution with full daemon privileges, including host root UID and unrestricted capabilities, when a user uploads a compressed (xz or gzip) archive into that container. This issue is fixed in Docker Engine 29.5.1 and moby/moby v2.0.0-beta.14. Workarounds include only running containers from trusted images, using authorization plugins to restrict access to the `PUT /containers/{id}/archive` endpoint, and avoiding piping compressed archives into containers created from untrusted images&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-41567</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
