<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Sun, 04 Oct 2026 00:21:35 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2024-50102 — x86: fix user address masking non-canonical speculation issue</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2024-50102</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;x86: fix user address masking non-canonical speculation issue&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;It turns out that AMD has a &amp;#34;Meltdown Lite(tm)&amp;#34; issue with non-canonical
accesses in kernel space.  And so using just the high bit to decide
whether an access is in user space or kernel space ends up with the good
old &amp;#34;leak speculative data&amp;#34; if you have the right gadget using the
result:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;CVE-2020-12965 “Transient Execution of Non-Canonical Accesses“&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Now, the kernel surrounds the access with a STAC/CLAC pair, and those
instructions end up serializing execution on older Zen architectures,
which closes the speculation window.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;But that was true only up until Zen 5, which renames the AC bit [1].
That improves performance of STAC/CLAC a lot, but also means that the
speculation window is now open.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Note that this affects not just the new address masking, but also the
regular valid_user_address() check used by access_ok(), and the asm
version of the sign bit check in the get_user() helpers.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;It does not affect put_user() or clear_user() variants, since there&amp;#39;s no
speculative result to be used in a gadget for those operations.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;x86: fix user address masking non-canonical speculation issue&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;It turns out that AMD has a &amp;#34;Meltdown Lite(tm)&amp;#34; issue with non-canonical
accesses in kernel space.  And so using just the high bit to decide
whether an access is in user space or kernel space ends up with the good
old &amp;#34;leak speculative data&amp;#34; if you have the right gadget using the
result:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;CVE-2020-12965 “Transient Execution of Non-Canonical Accesses“&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Now, the kernel surrounds the access with a STAC/CLAC pair, and those
instructions end up serializing execution on older Zen architectures,
which closes the speculation window.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;But that was true only up until Zen 5, which renames the AC bit [1].
That improves performance of STAC/CLAC a lot, but also means that the
speculation window is now open.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Note that this affects not just the new address masking, but also the
regular valid_user_address() check used by access_ok(), and the asm
version of the sign bit check in the get_user() helpers.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;It does not affect put_user() or clear_user() variants, since there&amp;#39;s no
speculative result to be used in a gadget for those operations.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2024-50102</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
