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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Thu, 01 Oct 2026 05:19:34 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-63964 — usb: typec: ucsi: ccg: reject firmware images without a ':' record header</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-63964</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;usb: typec: ucsi: ccg: reject firmware images without a &amp;#39;:&amp;#39; record header&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;do_flash() locates the first .cyacd record with&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;p = strnchr(fw-&amp;gt;data, fw-&amp;gt;size, &amp;#39;:&amp;#39;);
	while (p &amp;lt; eof) {
		s = strnchr(p + 1, eof - p - 1, &amp;#39;:&amp;#39;);
		...
	}&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If the firmware image contains no &amp;#39;:&amp;#39; byte,  strnchr() returns NULL.
NULL compares less than the valid kernel pointer eof, so the loop body
runs and strnchr() is called with p + 1 == (void *)1 and a length of
roughly (unsigned long)eof, causing a wonderful crash.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The not_signed_fw fallthrough earlier in do_flash() and the chip-state
branches in ccg_fw_update_needed() allow an unsigned blob to reach this
loop, so a root user who can place a crafted file under /lib/firmware
and write the do_flash sysfs attribute can trigger the oops.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Bail out with -EINVAL when the initial strnchr() returns NULL.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;usb: typec: ucsi: ccg: reject firmware images without a &amp;#39;:&amp;#39; record header&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;do_flash() locates the first .cyacd record with&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;p = strnchr(fw-&amp;gt;data, fw-&amp;gt;size, &amp;#39;:&amp;#39;);
	while (p &amp;lt; eof) {
		s = strnchr(p + 1, eof - p - 1, &amp;#39;:&amp;#39;);
		...
	}&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If the firmware image contains no &amp;#39;:&amp;#39; byte,  strnchr() returns NULL.
NULL compares less than the valid kernel pointer eof, so the loop body
runs and strnchr() is called with p + 1 == (void *)1 and a length of
roughly (unsigned long)eof, causing a wonderful crash.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The not_signed_fw fallthrough earlier in do_flash() and the chip-state
branches in ccg_fw_update_needed() allow an unsigned blob to reach this
loop, so a root user who can place a crafted file under /lib/firmware
and write the do_flash sysfs attribute can trigger the oops.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Bail out with -EINVAL when the initial strnchr() returns NULL.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-63964</guid>
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