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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 13:05:31 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-53078 — bpf: Fix same-register dst/src OOB read and pointer leak in sock_ops</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-53078</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;bpf: Fix same-register dst/src OOB read and pointer leak in sock_ops&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When a BPF sock_ops program accesses ctx fields with dst_reg == src_reg,
the SOCK_OPS_GET_SK() and SOCK_OPS_GET_FIELD() macros fail to zero the
destination register in the !fullsock / !locked_tcp_sock path.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Both macros borrow a temporary register to check is_fullsock /
is_locked_tcp_sock when dst_reg == src_reg, because dst_reg holds the
ctx pointer. When the check is false (e.g., TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV state with
a request_sock), dst_reg should be zeroed but is not, leaving the stale
ctx pointer:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- SOCK_OPS_GET_SK: dst_reg retains the ctx pointer, passes NULL checks
   as PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL, and can be used as a bogus socket pointer,
   leading to stack-out-of-bounds access in helpers like
   bpf_skc_to_tcp6_sock().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- SOCK_OPS_GET_FIELD: dst_reg retains the ctx pointer which the
   verifier believes is a SCALAR_VALUE, leaking a kernel pointer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix both macros by:
 - Changing JMP_A(1) to JMP_A(2) in the fullsock path to skip the
   added instruction.
 - Adding BPF_MOV64_IMM(si-&amp;gt;dst_reg, 0) after the temp register
   restore in the !fullsock path, placed after the restore because
   dst_reg == src_reg means we need src_reg intact to read ctx-&amp;gt;temp.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;bpf: Fix same-register dst/src OOB read and pointer leak in sock_ops&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When a BPF sock_ops program accesses ctx fields with dst_reg == src_reg,
the SOCK_OPS_GET_SK() and SOCK_OPS_GET_FIELD() macros fail to zero the
destination register in the !fullsock / !locked_tcp_sock path.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Both macros borrow a temporary register to check is_fullsock /
is_locked_tcp_sock when dst_reg == src_reg, because dst_reg holds the
ctx pointer. When the check is false (e.g., TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV state with
a request_sock), dst_reg should be zeroed but is not, leaving the stale
ctx pointer:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- SOCK_OPS_GET_SK: dst_reg retains the ctx pointer, passes NULL checks
   as PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL, and can be used as a bogus socket pointer,
   leading to stack-out-of-bounds access in helpers like
   bpf_skc_to_tcp6_sock().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- SOCK_OPS_GET_FIELD: dst_reg retains the ctx pointer which the
   verifier believes is a SCALAR_VALUE, leaking a kernel pointer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix both macros by:
 - Changing JMP_A(1) to JMP_A(2) in the fullsock path to skip the
   added instruction.
 - Adding BPF_MOV64_IMM(si-&amp;gt;dst_reg, 0) after the temp register
   restore in the !fullsock path, placed after the restore because
   dst_reg == src_reg means we need src_reg intact to read ctx-&amp;gt;temp.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-53078</guid>
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