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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 08:47:51 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-52915 — netfilter: ip6t_hbh: reject oversized option lists</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-52915</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;netfilter: ip6t_hbh: reject oversized option lists&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;struct ip6t_opts stores at most IP6T_OPTS_OPTSNR option descriptors,
but hbh_mt6_check() does not reject larger optsnr values supplied from
userspace.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Validate optsnr in the rule setup path so only match data that fits the
fixed-size opts array can be installed. This follows the existing xtables
pattern of rejecting invalid user-provided counts in checkentry() and
keeps the packet matching path unchanged.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`struct ip6t_opts` has a fixed `opts[IP6T_OPTS_OPTSNR]` array,
where `IP6T_OPTS_OPTSNR` is 16, then off-by-one array access is possible:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;[  137.924693][ T8692] UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in ../net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6t_hbh.c:110:29
[  137.926167][ T8692] index 16 is out of range for type &amp;#39;__u16 [16]&amp;#39;&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;netfilter: ip6t_hbh: reject oversized option lists&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;struct ip6t_opts stores at most IP6T_OPTS_OPTSNR option descriptors,
but hbh_mt6_check() does not reject larger optsnr values supplied from
userspace.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Validate optsnr in the rule setup path so only match data that fits the
fixed-size opts array can be installed. This follows the existing xtables
pattern of rejecting invalid user-provided counts in checkentry() and
keeps the packet matching path unchanged.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`struct ip6t_opts` has a fixed `opts[IP6T_OPTS_OPTSNR]` array,
where `IP6T_OPTS_OPTSNR` is 16, then off-by-one array access is possible:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;[  137.924693][ T8692] UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in ../net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6t_hbh.c:110:29
[  137.926167][ T8692] index 16 is out of range for type &amp;#39;__u16 [16]&amp;#39;&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-52915</guid>
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