https://vulnerability.circl.lu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Fri, 02 Oct 2026 04:04:09 +0000 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-55220 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> pimcore</p> <p>Pimcore is an Open Source Data &amp; Experience Management Platform. Prior to 11.5.19, 12.3.10, and 2026.1.6, Pimcore\Model\DataObject\ClassDefinition\Data\Hotspotimage::getDataFromResource() in models/DataObject/ClassDefinition/Data/Hotspotimage.php passes the field __hotspots object-store column to Pimcore\Tool\Serialize::unserialize() without an allowed-classes restriction after JSON decoding fails. An attacker with a separate capability to write crafted PHP serialized bytes into that column can instantiate available classes and trigger magic methods when an affected DataObject is loaded, which can produce arbitrary file writes or code execution through bundled gadget chains. The related ImageGallery, Block, and Video callers use the same fallback pattern, but the identified June fix changes the Hotspotimage caller only. This issue is fixed for Hotspotimage in versions 11.5.19, 12.3.10, and 2026.1.6.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> pimcore</p> <p>Pimcore is an Open Source Data &amp; Experience Management Platform. Prior to 11.5.19, 12.3.10, and 2026.1.6, Pimcore\Model\DataObject\ClassDefinition\Data\Hotspotimage::getDataFromResource() in models/DataObject/ClassDefinition/Data/Hotspotimage.php passes the field __hotspots object-store column to Pimcore\Tool\Serialize::unserialize() without an allowed-classes restriction after JSON decoding fails. An attacker with a separate capability to write crafted PHP serialized bytes into that column can instantiate available classes and trigger magic methods when an affected DataObject is loaded, which can produce arbitrary file writes or code execution through bundled gadget chains. The related ImageGallery, Block, and Video callers use the same fallback pattern, but the identified June fix changes the Hotspotimage caller only. This issue is fixed for Hotspotimage in versions 11.5.19, 12.3.10, and 2026.1.6.</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-55220 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-w23p-wrp7-ch38 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Packagist: pimcore/pimcore</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>`Pimcore\Model\DataObject\ClassDefinition\Data\Hotspotimage::getDataFromResource()` deserializes the `*__hotspots` object-store column through the `Pimcore\Tool\Serialize::unserialize()` wrapper **without a class allowlist** (the wrapper&#39;s `$allowedClasses` parameter defaults to `true`, i.e. fully unrestricted). Because the persistence layer always stores this column as PHP-`serialize()`d bytes, every load of a DataObject that has a Hotspotimage (advanced image) field runs an unrestricted `unserialize()` over the stored column value. An attacker who can write the `*__hotspots` store column with crafted serialized bytes achieves PHP Object Injection (CWE-502): arbitrary classes are instantiated and their magic methods (`__wakeup`/`__destruct`) execute, which is exploitable for remote code execution via gadget chains present in Pimcore&#39;s own bundled dependencies (e.g. `guzzlehttp/guzzle`).</p> <p>The same field-data family also affects the sibling marshallers `ImageGallery`, `Block`, and `Video`, which use the identical `json_decode(...) ?: Serialize::unserialize(...)` fallback over their respective store columns. The root cause is shared: `Serialize::unserialize()` defaults to an unrestricted class list, and these callers pass no second argument.</p> <p>## Severity</p> <p>High. Successful exploitation yields PHP Object Injection leading to remote code execution (proven below as arbitrary file write using a gadget from Pimcore&#39;s bundled `guzzlehttp/guzzle 7.11.0`). This is the deser…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Packagist: pimcore/pimcore</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>`Pimcore\Model\DataObject\ClassDefinition\Data\Hotspotimage::getDataFromResource()` deserializes the `*__hotspots` object-store column through the `Pimcore\Tool\Serialize::unserialize()` wrapper **without a class allowlist** (the wrapper&#39;s `$allowedClasses` parameter defaults to `true`, i.e. fully unrestricted). Because the persistence layer always stores this column as PHP-`serialize()`d bytes, every load of a DataObject that has a Hotspotimage (advanced image) field runs an unrestricted `unserialize()` over the stored column value. An attacker who can write the `*__hotspots` store column with crafted serialized bytes achieves PHP Object Injection (CWE-502): arbitrary classes are instantiated and their magic methods (`__wakeup`/`__destruct`) execute, which is exploitable for remote code execution via gadget chains present in Pimcore&#39;s own bundled dependencies (e.g. `guzzlehttp/guzzle`).</p> <p>The same field-data family also affects the sibling marshallers `ImageGallery`, `Block`, and `Video`, which use the identical `json_decode(...) ?: Serialize::unserialize(...)` fallback over their respective store columns. The root cause is shared: `Serialize::unserialize()` defaults to an unrestricted class list, and these callers pass no second argument.</p> <p>## Severity</p> <p>High. Successful exploitation yields PHP Object Injection leading to remote code execution (proven below as arbitrary file write using a gadget from Pimcore&#39;s bundled `guzzlehttp/guzzle 7.11.0`). This is the deser…</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-w23p-wrp7-ch38