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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2026 10:38:07 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-43070 — bpf: Reset register ID for BPF_END value tracking</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-43070</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;bpf: Reset register ID for BPF_END value tracking&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When a register undergoes a BPF_END (byte swap) operation, its scalar
value is mutated in-place. If this register previously shared a scalar ID
with another register (e.g., after an `r1 = r0` assignment), this tie must
be broken.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Currently, the verifier misses resetting `dst_reg-&amp;gt;id` to 0 for BPF_END.
Consequently, if a conditional jump checks the swapped register, the
verifier incorrectly propagates the learned bounds to the linked register,
leading to false confidence in the linked register&amp;#39;s value and potentially
allowing out-of-bounds memory accesses.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix this by explicitly resetting `dst_reg-&amp;gt;id` to 0 in the BPF_END case
to break the scalar tie, similar to how BPF_NEG handles it via
`__mark_reg_known`.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;bpf: Reset register ID for BPF_END value tracking&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When a register undergoes a BPF_END (byte swap) operation, its scalar
value is mutated in-place. If this register previously shared a scalar ID
with another register (e.g., after an `r1 = r0` assignment), this tie must
be broken.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Currently, the verifier misses resetting `dst_reg-&amp;gt;id` to 0 for BPF_END.
Consequently, if a conditional jump checks the swapped register, the
verifier incorrectly propagates the learned bounds to the linked register,
leading to false confidence in the linked register&amp;#39;s value and potentially
allowing out-of-bounds memory accesses.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix this by explicitly resetting `dst_reg-&amp;gt;id` to 0 in the BPF_END case
to break the scalar tie, similar to how BPF_NEG handles it via
`__mark_reg_known`.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-43070</guid>
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