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    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2026 04:44:59 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-77354 — kin-openapi: Uncontrolled resource consumption in openapi3filter deepObject query parameter decoding</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-77354</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; getkin kin-openapi&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;kin-openapi is a Go project for handling OpenAPI files. From 0.124.0 until 0.142.0, openapi3filter.sliceMapToSlice in openapi3filter/req_resp_decoder.go converts attacker-controlled sparse indexes from a deepObject query parameter into a dense slice by allocating entries from zero through the largest supplied index, after which buildResObj creates another slice of the same length. This allocation occurs before schema validation, so maxItems does not prevent it. An unauthenticated client can send a small query such as param[items][50000000]=x to an endpoint whose deepObject schema contains an array, forcing multi-gigabyte heap allocation and causing an OOM kill or restart loop. Other request-body encodings and styled parameters that do not produce bracketed integer indexes are not affected. This issue is fixed in version 0.142.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; getkin kin-openapi&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;kin-openapi is a Go project for handling OpenAPI files. From 0.124.0 until 0.142.0, openapi3filter.sliceMapToSlice in openapi3filter/req_resp_decoder.go converts attacker-controlled sparse indexes from a deepObject query parameter into a dense slice by allocating entries from zero through the largest supplied index, after which buildResObj creates another slice of the same length. This allocation occurs before schema validation, so maxItems does not prevent it. An unauthenticated client can send a small query such as param[items][50000000]=x to an endpoint whose deepObject schema contains an array, forcing multi-gigabyte heap allocation and causing an OOM kill or restart loop. Other request-body encodings and styled parameters that do not produce bracketed integer indexes are not affected. This issue is fixed in version 0.142.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-77354</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-xhj3-7xw9-vr34 — kin-openapi has uncontrolled resource consumption in openapi3filter deepObject query parameter decoding</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-xhj3-7xw9-vr34</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/getkin/kin-openapi&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An uncontrolled resource consumption vulnerability in `openapi3filter` lets any unauthenticated client force multi-gigabyte heap allocation with a single, tiny HTTP request. When a spec declares a `deepObject`-style query parameter whose schema contains an array (a normal, documented pattern), the decoder reconstructs the array by reading the **largest attacker-supplied index** and allocating one slot for every position from `0` up to that index — *before* schema validation (including `maxItems`) ever runs. A request as small as 24 bytes (`?param[items][50000000]=x`) drives heap allocation to **~6.1 GiB**, reliably triggering an OOM kill / restart loop on memory-constrained services.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The OpenAPI `style: deepObject` serialization lets clients express arrays in the query string using bracket notation, e.g. `param[items][0]=a&amp;amp;param[items][1]=b`. The decoder first collects these into an intermediate `map[string]any` keyed by the string of the index, then converts that sparse map into a real `[]any` in [`sliceMapToSlice`](https://github.com/getkin/kin-openapi/blob/master/openapi3filter/req_resp_decoder.go#L936):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
// req_resp_decoder.go (vulnerable version)
func sliceMapToSlice(m map[string]any) ([]any, error) {
	var result []any
	keys := make([]int, 0, len(m))
	for k := range m {
		key, err := strconv.Atoi(k)          // &amp;#34;50000000&amp;#34; -&amp;gt; 50000000, attacker-controlled
		if err != nil {
			return nil, fmt.Errorf(&amp;#34;array indexes must be integers: %w&amp;#34;, er…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/getkin/kin-openapi&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An uncontrolled resource consumption vulnerability in `openapi3filter` lets any unauthenticated client force multi-gigabyte heap allocation with a single, tiny HTTP request. When a spec declares a `deepObject`-style query parameter whose schema contains an array (a normal, documented pattern), the decoder reconstructs the array by reading the **largest attacker-supplied index** and allocating one slot for every position from `0` up to that index — *before* schema validation (including `maxItems`) ever runs. A request as small as 24 bytes (`?param[items][50000000]=x`) drives heap allocation to **~6.1 GiB**, reliably triggering an OOM kill / restart loop on memory-constrained services.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The OpenAPI `style: deepObject` serialization lets clients express arrays in the query string using bracket notation, e.g. `param[items][0]=a&amp;amp;param[items][1]=b`. The decoder first collects these into an intermediate `map[string]any` keyed by the string of the index, then converts that sparse map into a real `[]any` in [`sliceMapToSlice`](https://github.com/getkin/kin-openapi/blob/master/openapi3filter/req_resp_decoder.go#L936):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
// req_resp_decoder.go (vulnerable version)
func sliceMapToSlice(m map[string]any) ([]any, error) {
	var result []any
	keys := make([]int, 0, len(m))
	for k := range m {
		key, err := strconv.Atoi(k)          // &amp;#34;50000000&amp;#34; -&amp;gt; 50000000, attacker-controlled
		if err != nil {
			return nil, fmt.Errorf(&amp;#34;array indexes must be integers: %w&amp;#34;, er…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-xhj3-7xw9-vr34</guid>
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