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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sun, 04 Oct 2026 17:08:45 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-45890 — xen-netback: reject zero-queue configuration from guest</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-45890</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;xen-netback: reject zero-queue configuration from guest&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A malicious or buggy Xen guest can write &amp;#34;0&amp;#34; to the xenbus key
&amp;#34;multi-queue-num-queues&amp;#34;. The connect() function in the backend only
validates the upper bound (requested_num_queues &amp;gt; xenvif_max_queues)
but not zero, allowing requested_num_queues=0 to reach
vzalloc(array_size(0, sizeof(struct xenvif_queue))), which triggers
WARN_ON_ONCE(!size) in __vmalloc_node_range().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;On systems with panic_on_warn=1, this allows a guest-to-host denial
of service.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Xen network interface specification requires
the queue count to be &amp;#34;greater than zero&amp;#34;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Add a zero check to match the validation already present
in xen-blkback, which has included this
guard since its multi-queue support was added.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;xen-netback: reject zero-queue configuration from guest&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A malicious or buggy Xen guest can write &amp;#34;0&amp;#34; to the xenbus key
&amp;#34;multi-queue-num-queues&amp;#34;. The connect() function in the backend only
validates the upper bound (requested_num_queues &amp;gt; xenvif_max_queues)
but not zero, allowing requested_num_queues=0 to reach
vzalloc(array_size(0, sizeof(struct xenvif_queue))), which triggers
WARN_ON_ONCE(!size) in __vmalloc_node_range().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;On systems with panic_on_warn=1, this allows a guest-to-host denial
of service.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Xen network interface specification requires
the queue count to be &amp;#34;greater than zero&amp;#34;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Add a zero check to match the validation already present
in xen-blkback, which has included this
guard since its multi-queue support was added.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-45890</guid>
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