https://vulnerability.circl.lu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Thu, 01 Oct 2026 05:17:32 +0000 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-73620 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> gitpython-developers GitPython</p> <p>GitPython before 3.1.57 fails to guard git option forwarding in IndexFile.checkout() and TagReference.create(), allowing attackers to pass unsafe options via kwargs. Attackers can use --prefix to overwrite arbitrary files with repository content or -F to read arbitrary files returned in-band.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> gitpython-developers GitPython</p> <p>GitPython before 3.1.57 fails to guard git option forwarding in IndexFile.checkout() and TagReference.create(), allowing attackers to pass unsafe options via kwargs. Attackers can use --prefix to overwrite arbitrary files with repository content or -F to read arbitrary files returned in-band.</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-73620 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-3f7w-8rr8-f37f <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: GitPython</p> <p>**Target:** gitpython-developers/GitPython **Tested:** HEAD `07e80555` (2026-07-25), latest release 3.1.55, `git version 2.50.1` **Reported instances:** 2 exploitable, from a sweep of 14 unguarded call sites</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>GitPython blocks dangerous git options through `Git.check_unsafe_options()`, gated per method by an `allow_unsafe_options` parameter. That guard is applied **per call site**, so any API that forwards `**kwargs` into a git command without calling it passes caller-controlled options straight to git.</p> <p>A mechanical sweep of every method that forwards `**kwargs` into a `.git.&lt;command&gt;(...)` call found **14 sites with no guard**. Two reach a git option that takes a filesystem path:</p> <p>| # | Call site | git option | Impact | |---|---|---|---| | 1 | `IndexFile.checkout()` → `git checkout-index` | `--prefix=&lt;path&gt;` | arbitrary file **overwrite** with repository-controlled content | | 2 | `TagReference.create()` → `git tag` | `-F &lt;file&gt;` / `--file=&lt;file&gt;` | arbitrary file **read**, returned in-band |</p> <p>This is the same defect class already fixed in `Commit.count()` (GHSA-p538-c434-8v24), `Repo.archive()` and `Git.ls_remote()` (GHSA-956x-8gvw-wg5v). Both instances below are still present at HEAD.</p> <p>---</p> <p>## Instance 1 — `IndexFile.checkout()`: arbitrary file overwrite</p> <p>`git/index/base.py:1210` accepts `**kwargs` and forwards them with no guard:</p> <p>```python def checkout(self, paths=None, force=False, fprogress=lambda *args: None, **kwargs): ... proc = self.repo.git.ch…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: GitPython</p> <p>**Target:** gitpython-developers/GitPython **Tested:** HEAD `07e80555` (2026-07-25), latest release 3.1.55, `git version 2.50.1` **Reported instances:** 2 exploitable, from a sweep of 14 unguarded call sites</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>GitPython blocks dangerous git options through `Git.check_unsafe_options()`, gated per method by an `allow_unsafe_options` parameter. That guard is applied **per call site**, so any API that forwards `**kwargs` into a git command without calling it passes caller-controlled options straight to git.</p> <p>A mechanical sweep of every method that forwards `**kwargs` into a `.git.&lt;command&gt;(...)` call found **14 sites with no guard**. Two reach a git option that takes a filesystem path:</p> <p>| # | Call site | git option | Impact | |---|---|---|---| | 1 | `IndexFile.checkout()` → `git checkout-index` | `--prefix=&lt;path&gt;` | arbitrary file **overwrite** with repository-controlled content | | 2 | `TagReference.create()` → `git tag` | `-F &lt;file&gt;` / `--file=&lt;file&gt;` | arbitrary file **read**, returned in-band |</p> <p>This is the same defect class already fixed in `Commit.count()` (GHSA-p538-c434-8v24), `Repo.archive()` and `Git.ls_remote()` (GHSA-956x-8gvw-wg5v). Both instances below are still present at HEAD.</p> <p>---</p> <p>## Instance 1 — `IndexFile.checkout()`: arbitrary file overwrite</p> <p>`git/index/base.py:1210` accepts `**kwargs` and forwards them with no guard:</p> <p>```python def checkout(self, paths=None, force=False, fprogress=lambda *args: None, **kwargs): ... proc = self.repo.git.ch…</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-3f7w-8rr8-f37f