https://vulnerability.circl.lu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Sun, 04 Oct 2026 09:04:39 +0000 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2025-40306 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Linux</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>orangefs: fix xattr related buffer overflow...</p> <p>Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt; forwarded me a message from Disclosure &lt;disclosure@aisle.com&gt; with the following warning:</p> <p>&gt; The helper `xattr_key()` uses the pointer variable in the loop condition &gt; rather than dereferencing it. As `key` is incremented, it remains non-NULL &gt; (until it runs into unmapped memory), so the loop does not terminate on &gt; valid C strings and will walk memory indefinitely, consuming CPU or hanging &gt; the thread.</p> <p>I easily reproduced this with setfattr and getfattr, causing a kernel oops, hung user processes and corrupted orangefs files. Disclosure sent along a diff (not a patch) with a suggested fix, which I based this patch on.</p> <p>After xattr_key started working right, xfstest generic/069 exposed an xattr related memory leak that lead to OOM. xattr_key returns a hashed key. When adding xattrs to the orangefs xattr cache, orangefs used hash_add, a kernel hashing macro. hash_add also hashes the key using hash_log which resulted in additions to the xattr cache going to the wrong hash bucket. generic/069 tortures a single file and orangefs does a getattr for the xattr &#34;security.capability&#34; every time. Orangefs negative caches on xattrs which includes a kmalloc. Since adds to the xattr cache were going to the wrong bucket, every getattr for &#34;security.capability&#34; resulted in another kmalloc, none of which were ever freed.</p> <p>I changed the two uses of…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Linux</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>orangefs: fix xattr related buffer overflow...</p> <p>Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt; forwarded me a message from Disclosure &lt;disclosure@aisle.com&gt; with the following warning:</p> <p>&gt; The helper `xattr_key()` uses the pointer variable in the loop condition &gt; rather than dereferencing it. As `key` is incremented, it remains non-NULL &gt; (until it runs into unmapped memory), so the loop does not terminate on &gt; valid C strings and will walk memory indefinitely, consuming CPU or hanging &gt; the thread.</p> <p>I easily reproduced this with setfattr and getfattr, causing a kernel oops, hung user processes and corrupted orangefs files. Disclosure sent along a diff (not a patch) with a suggested fix, which I based this patch on.</p> <p>After xattr_key started working right, xfstest generic/069 exposed an xattr related memory leak that lead to OOM. xattr_key returns a hashed key. When adding xattrs to the orangefs xattr cache, orangefs used hash_add, a kernel hashing macro. hash_add also hashes the key using hash_log which resulted in additions to the xattr cache going to the wrong hash bucket. generic/069 tortures a single file and orangefs does a getattr for the xattr &#34;security.capability&#34; every time. Orangefs negative caches on xattrs which includes a kmalloc. Since adds to the xattr cache were going to the wrong bucket, every getattr for &#34;security.capability&#34; resulted in another kmalloc, none of which were ever freed.</p> <p>I changed the two uses of…</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2025-40306