<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Thu, 01 Oct 2026 19:34:03 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-31705 — ksmbd: fix out-of-bounds write in smb2_get_ea() EA alignment</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-31705</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ksmbd: fix out-of-bounds write in smb2_get_ea() EA alignment&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;smb2_get_ea() applies 4-byte alignment padding via memset() after
writing each EA entry. The bounds check on buf_free_len is performed
before the value memcpy, but the alignment memset fires unconditionally
afterward with no check on remaining space.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When the EA value exactly fills the remaining buffer (buf_free_len == 0
after value subtraction), the alignment memset writes 1-3 NUL bytes
past the buf_free_len boundary. In compound requests where the response
buffer is shared across commands, the first command (e.g., READ) can
consume most of the buffer, leaving a tight remainder for the QUERY_INFO
EA response. The alignment memset then overwrites past the physical
kvmalloc allocation into adjacent kernel heap memory.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Add a bounds check before the alignment memset to ensure buf_free_len
can accommodate the padding bytes.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is the same bug pattern fixed by commit beef2634f81f (&amp;#34;ksmbd: fix
potencial OOB in get_file_all_info() for compound requests&amp;#34;) and
commit fda9522ed6af (&amp;#34;ksmbd: fix OOB write in QUERY_INFO for compound
requests&amp;#34;), both of which added bounds checks before unconditional
writes in QUERY_INFO response handlers.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ksmbd: fix out-of-bounds write in smb2_get_ea() EA alignment&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;smb2_get_ea() applies 4-byte alignment padding via memset() after
writing each EA entry. The bounds check on buf_free_len is performed
before the value memcpy, but the alignment memset fires unconditionally
afterward with no check on remaining space.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When the EA value exactly fills the remaining buffer (buf_free_len == 0
after value subtraction), the alignment memset writes 1-3 NUL bytes
past the buf_free_len boundary. In compound requests where the response
buffer is shared across commands, the first command (e.g., READ) can
consume most of the buffer, leaving a tight remainder for the QUERY_INFO
EA response. The alignment memset then overwrites past the physical
kvmalloc allocation into adjacent kernel heap memory.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Add a bounds check before the alignment memset to ensure buf_free_len
can accommodate the padding bytes.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is the same bug pattern fixed by commit beef2634f81f (&amp;#34;ksmbd: fix
potencial OOB in get_file_all_info() for compound requests&amp;#34;) and
commit fda9522ed6af (&amp;#34;ksmbd: fix OOB write in QUERY_INFO for compound
requests&amp;#34;), both of which added bounds checks before unconditional
writes in QUERY_INFO response handlers.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-31705</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
