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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 19:11:57 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-56819 — Netty: HTTP/2 decompression leaks ByteBuf reference count when the decompressor channel is already closed (Direct memor…</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-56819</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; netty&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. In versions 4.2.0.Final through 4.2.15.Final and 4.1.0.Final through 4.1.135.Final, a remote unauthenticated peer can leak one direct `ByteBuf` per HTTP/2 `DATA` frame in applications that enable HTTP/2 content decompression via `DelegatingDecompressorFrameListener`. When a `DATA` frame is processed for a stream whose decompressor has already been closed, `Http2Decompressor.decompress(...)` calls `decompressor.writeInbound(data.retain())` and does not release the retained buffer on the error path, eventually exhausting direct memory and crashing the JVM. This issue is fixed in versions 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; netty&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. In versions 4.2.0.Final through 4.2.15.Final and 4.1.0.Final through 4.1.135.Final, a remote unauthenticated peer can leak one direct `ByteBuf` per HTTP/2 `DATA` frame in applications that enable HTTP/2 content decompression via `DelegatingDecompressorFrameListener`. When a `DATA` frame is processed for a stream whose decompressor has already been closed, `Http2Decompressor.decompress(...)` calls `decompressor.writeInbound(data.retain())` and does not release the retained buffer on the error path, eventually exhausting direct memory and crashing the JVM. This issue is fixed in versions 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-56819</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-93wv-jw9v-4972 — Netty: HTTP/2 decompression leaks ByteBuf reference count when the decompressor channel is already closed (Direct memor…</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-93wv-jw9v-4972</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Maven: io.netty:netty-codec-http2&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A remote, unauthenticated peer can leak one direct `ByteBuf` per HTTP/2 `DATA` frame in
applications that enable HTTP/2 content decompression via `DelegatingDecompressorFrameListener`.
When a `DATA` frame is processed for a stream whose decompressor has already been closed,
`Http2Decompressor.decompress(...)` retains the frame buffer but never releases it on the error
path, so its reference count never returns to zero. Repeating this over a long-lived HTTP/2
connection exhausts direct memory and crashes the JVM with `OutOfMemoryError` — a denial of service.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In `codec-http2/src/main/java/io/netty/handler/codec/http2/DelegatingDecompressorFrameListener.java`,
`Http2Decompressor.decompress(...)` does:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```java
// around line 433
decompressor.writeInbound(data.retain());
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The argument `data.retain()` is evaluated **before** `writeInbound(...)` executes, incrementing the
buffer&amp;#39;s reference count (`refCnt: 1 -&amp;gt; 2`). The very first statement of
`EmbeddedChannel.writeInbound(...)` is `ensureOpen()` (`EmbeddedChannel.java:360`), which throws
`ClosedChannelException` when the decompressor&amp;#39;s internal `EmbeddedChannel` has already been closed.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When that happens:
- the `DATA` payload has been `retain()`ed but never entered the pipeline, so the decoder&amp;#39;s
  `finally { release() }` never runs;
- the surrounding `catch (Throwable t)` block in `decompress(...)` (around line 451) does **not**
  release the extra reference;
- the input buffer therefore can never…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Maven: io.netty:netty-codec-http2&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A remote, unauthenticated peer can leak one direct `ByteBuf` per HTTP/2 `DATA` frame in
applications that enable HTTP/2 content decompression via `DelegatingDecompressorFrameListener`.
When a `DATA` frame is processed for a stream whose decompressor has already been closed,
`Http2Decompressor.decompress(...)` retains the frame buffer but never releases it on the error
path, so its reference count never returns to zero. Repeating this over a long-lived HTTP/2
connection exhausts direct memory and crashes the JVM with `OutOfMemoryError` — a denial of service.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In `codec-http2/src/main/java/io/netty/handler/codec/http2/DelegatingDecompressorFrameListener.java`,
`Http2Decompressor.decompress(...)` does:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```java
// around line 433
decompressor.writeInbound(data.retain());
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The argument `data.retain()` is evaluated **before** `writeInbound(...)` executes, incrementing the
buffer&amp;#39;s reference count (`refCnt: 1 -&amp;gt; 2`). The very first statement of
`EmbeddedChannel.writeInbound(...)` is `ensureOpen()` (`EmbeddedChannel.java:360`), which throws
`ClosedChannelException` when the decompressor&amp;#39;s internal `EmbeddedChannel` has already been closed.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When that happens:
- the `DATA` payload has been `retain()`ed but never entered the pipeline, so the decoder&amp;#39;s
  `finally { release() }` never runs;
- the surrounding `catch (Throwable t)` block in `decompress(...)` (around line 451) does **not**
  release the extra reference;
- the input buffer therefore can never…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-93wv-jw9v-4972</guid>
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