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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2026 23:07:00 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-54008 — Open WebUI: Redirect-Bypass SSRF in OAuth `_process_picture_url`</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-54008</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; open-webui&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.6, backend/open_webui/utils/oauth.py::_process_picture_url calls validate_url(picture_url) on the initial URL only, then invokes aiohttp.ClientSession.get(picture_url, ...) without allow_redirects=False. aiohttp&amp;#39;s default is allow_redirects=True, max_redirects=10; the function does not pass the project&amp;#39;s AIOHTTP_CLIENT_ALLOW_REDIRECTS env constant either. An attacker with a valid OAuth IdP identity can therefore submit a public URL that 302-redirects to an internal address and read the internal response body via the attacker&amp;#39;s own profile_image_url field. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.6.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; open-webui&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.6, backend/open_webui/utils/oauth.py::_process_picture_url calls validate_url(picture_url) on the initial URL only, then invokes aiohttp.ClientSession.get(picture_url, ...) without allow_redirects=False. aiohttp&amp;#39;s default is allow_redirects=True, max_redirects=10; the function does not pass the project&amp;#39;s AIOHTTP_CLIENT_ALLOW_REDIRECTS env constant either. An attacker with a valid OAuth IdP identity can therefore submit a public URL that 302-redirects to an internal address and read the internal response body via the attacker&amp;#39;s own profile_image_url field. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.6.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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