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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2026 23:05:53 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-43023 — Bluetooth: SCO: fix race conditions in sco_sock_connect()</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-43023</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Bluetooth: SCO: fix race conditions in sco_sock_connect()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;sco_sock_connect() checks sk_state and sk_type without holding
the socket lock. Two concurrent connect() syscalls on the same
socket can both pass the check and enter sco_connect(), leading
to use-after-free.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The buggy scenario involves three participants and was confirmed
with additional logging instrumentation:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Thread A (connect):    HCI disconnect:      Thread B (connect):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;sco_sock_connect(sk)                        sco_sock_connect(sk)
  sk_state==BT_OPEN                           sk_state==BT_OPEN
  (pass, no lock)                             (pass, no lock)
  sco_connect(sk):                            sco_connect(sk):
    hci_dev_lock                                hci_dev_lock
    hci_connect_sco                               &amp;lt;- blocked
      -&amp;gt; hcon1
    sco_conn_add-&amp;gt;conn1
    lock_sock(sk)
    sco_chan_add:
      conn1-&amp;gt;sk = sk
      sk-&amp;gt;conn = conn1
    sk_state=BT_CONNECT
    release_sock
    hci_dev_unlock
                           hci_dev_lock
                           sco_conn_del:
                             lock_sock(sk)
                             sco_chan_del:
                               sk-&amp;gt;conn=NULL
                               conn1-&amp;gt;sk=NULL
                               sk_state=
                                 BT_CLOSED
                               SOCK_ZAPPED
                             release_sock…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Bluetooth: SCO: fix race conditions in sco_sock_connect()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;sco_sock_connect() checks sk_state and sk_type without holding
the socket lock. Two concurrent connect() syscalls on the same
socket can both pass the check and enter sco_connect(), leading
to use-after-free.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The buggy scenario involves three participants and was confirmed
with additional logging instrumentation:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Thread A (connect):    HCI disconnect:      Thread B (connect):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;sco_sock_connect(sk)                        sco_sock_connect(sk)
  sk_state==BT_OPEN                           sk_state==BT_OPEN
  (pass, no lock)                             (pass, no lock)
  sco_connect(sk):                            sco_connect(sk):
    hci_dev_lock                                hci_dev_lock
    hci_connect_sco                               &amp;lt;- blocked
      -&amp;gt; hcon1
    sco_conn_add-&amp;gt;conn1
    lock_sock(sk)
    sco_chan_add:
      conn1-&amp;gt;sk = sk
      sk-&amp;gt;conn = conn1
    sk_state=BT_CONNECT
    release_sock
    hci_dev_unlock
                           hci_dev_lock
                           sco_conn_del:
                             lock_sock(sk)
                             sco_chan_del:
                               sk-&amp;gt;conn=NULL
                               conn1-&amp;gt;sk=NULL
                               sk_state=
                                 BT_CLOSED
                               SOCK_ZAPPED
                             release_sock…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-43023</guid>
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