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      <title>CVE-2026-45321 — Malware in 42 @tanstack/* packages exfiltrates cloud credentials, GitHub tokens, and SSH keys</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-45321</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; @tanstack arktype-adapter, @tanstack eslint-plugin-router, @tanstack eslint-plugin-start, @tanstack history, @tanstack nitro-v2-vite-plugin, @tanstack react-router, @tanstack react-router-devtools, @tanstack react-router-ssr-query, @tanstack react-start, @tanstack react-start-client and 32 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;On 2026-05-11, between approximately 19:20 and 19:26 UTC, 84 malicious versions across 42 @tanstack/* packages were published to the npm registry. The publishes were authenticated via the legitimate GitHub Actions OIDC trusted-publisher binding for TanStack/router, but the publish workflow itself was not modified. The attacker chained three known vulnerability classes — a pull_request_target &amp;#34;Pwn Request&amp;#34; misconfiguration, GitHub Actions cache poisoning across the fork↔base trust boundary, and runtime memory extraction of the OIDC token from the Actions runner process — to publish credential-stealing malware under a trusted identity. Each affected package received exactly two malicious versions, published a few minutes apart.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; @tanstack arktype-adapter, @tanstack eslint-plugin-router, @tanstack eslint-plugin-start, @tanstack history, @tanstack nitro-v2-vite-plugin, @tanstack react-router, @tanstack react-router-devtools, @tanstack react-router-ssr-query, @tanstack react-start, @tanstack react-start-client and 32 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;On 2026-05-11, between approximately 19:20 and 19:26 UTC, 84 malicious versions across 42 @tanstack/* packages were published to the npm registry. The publishes were authenticated via the legitimate GitHub Actions OIDC trusted-publisher binding for TanStack/router, but the publish workflow itself was not modified. The attacker chained three known vulnerability classes — a pull_request_target &amp;#34;Pwn Request&amp;#34; misconfiguration, GitHub Actions cache poisoning across the fork↔base trust boundary, and runtime memory extraction of the OIDC token from the Actions runner process — to publish credential-stealing malware under a trusted identity. Each affected package received exactly two malicious versions, published a few minutes apart.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-45321</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-g7cv-rxg3-hmpx — Malware in @tanstack/* packages exfiltrates cloud credentials, GitHub tokens, and SSH keys</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-g7cv-rxg3-hmpx</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: @tanstack/arktype-adapter, npm: @tanstack/eslint-plugin-router, npm: @tanstack/eslint-plugin-start, npm: @tanstack/history, npm: @tanstack/nitro-v2-vite-plugin, npm: @tanstack/react-router, npm: @tanstack/react-router-devtools, npm: @tanstack/react-router-ssr-query, npm: @tanstack/react-start, npm: @tanstack/react-start-client and 32 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;On 2026-05-11, between approximately 19:20 and 19:26 UTC, 84 malicious versions across 42 `@tanstack/*` packages were published to the npm registry. The publishes were authenticated via the legitimate GitHub Actions OIDC trusted-publisher binding for `TanStack/router`, but the publish workflow itself was not modified. The attacker chained three known vulnerability classes — a `pull_request_target` &amp;#34;Pwn Request&amp;#34; misconfiguration, GitHub Actions cache poisoning across the fork↔base trust boundary, and runtime memory extraction of the OIDC token from the Actions runner process — to publish credential-stealing malware under a trusted identity.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Each affected package received exactly two malicious versions, published a few minutes apart.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A user installing any affected version executes a payload (~2.3 MB obfuscated `router_init.js`) at install time that:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Harvests credentials from common locations:
  - AWS instance metadata (IMDS) and Secrets Manager
  - GCP metadata service
  - Kubernetes service-account tokens
  - HashiCorp Vault tokens
  - `~/.npmrc` (npm tokens)
  - GitHub tokens (env vars, `gh` CLI config, `.git-credentials`)
  - SSH private keys (`~/.ssh/`)
- Exfiltrates harvested data over the Session/Oxen messenger file-upload network (`filev2.getsession.org`, `seed{1,2,3}.getsession.org`). This is end-to-end encrypted with no attacker-controlled C2, so blocking by IP or domain is the only network mitigation.
- Enumerates packages that the victim…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: @tanstack/arktype-adapter, npm: @tanstack/eslint-plugin-router, npm: @tanstack/eslint-plugin-start, npm: @tanstack/history, npm: @tanstack/nitro-v2-vite-plugin, npm: @tanstack/react-router, npm: @tanstack/react-router-devtools, npm: @tanstack/react-router-ssr-query, npm: @tanstack/react-start, npm: @tanstack/react-start-client and 32 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;On 2026-05-11, between approximately 19:20 and 19:26 UTC, 84 malicious versions across 42 `@tanstack/*` packages were published to the npm registry. The publishes were authenticated via the legitimate GitHub Actions OIDC trusted-publisher binding for `TanStack/router`, but the publish workflow itself was not modified. The attacker chained three known vulnerability classes — a `pull_request_target` &amp;#34;Pwn Request&amp;#34; misconfiguration, GitHub Actions cache poisoning across the fork↔base trust boundary, and runtime memory extraction of the OIDC token from the Actions runner process — to publish credential-stealing malware under a trusted identity.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Each affected package received exactly two malicious versions, published a few minutes apart.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A user installing any affected version executes a payload (~2.3 MB obfuscated `router_init.js`) at install time that:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Harvests credentials from common locations:
  - AWS instance metadata (IMDS) and Secrets Manager
  - GCP metadata service
  - Kubernetes service-account tokens
  - HashiCorp Vault tokens
  - `~/.npmrc` (npm tokens)
  - GitHub tokens (env vars, `gh` CLI config, `.git-credentials`)
  - SSH private keys (`~/.ssh/`)
- Exfiltrates harvested data over the Session/Oxen messenger file-upload network (`filev2.getsession.org`, `seed{1,2,3}.getsession.org`). This is end-to-end encrypted with no attacker-controlled C2, so blocking by IP or domain is the only network mitigation.
- Enumerates packages that the victim…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-g7cv-rxg3-hmpx</guid>
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