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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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      <title>CVE-2026-31883 — FreeRDP has a `size_t` underflow in ADPCM decoder leads to heap-buffer-overflow write</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-31883</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; FreeRDP&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;FreeRDP is a free implementation of the Remote Desktop Protocol. Prior to 3.24.0, a size_t underflow in the IMA-ADPCM and MS-ADPCM audio decoders leads to heap-buffer-overflow write via the RDPSND audio channel. In libfreerdp/codec/dsp.c, the IMA-ADPCM and MS-ADPCM decoders subtract block header sizes from a size_t variable without checking for underflow. When nBlockAlign (received from the server) is set such that size % block_size == 0 triggers the header parsing at a point where size is smaller than the header (4 or 8 bytes), the subtraction wraps size to ~SIZE_MAX. The while (size &amp;gt; 0) loop then continues for an astronomical number of iterations. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.24.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; FreeRDP&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;FreeRDP is a free implementation of the Remote Desktop Protocol. Prior to 3.24.0, a size_t underflow in the IMA-ADPCM and MS-ADPCM audio decoders leads to heap-buffer-overflow write via the RDPSND audio channel. In libfreerdp/codec/dsp.c, the IMA-ADPCM and MS-ADPCM decoders subtract block header sizes from a size_t variable without checking for underflow. When nBlockAlign (received from the server) is set such that size % block_size == 0 triggers the header parsing at a point where size is smaller than the header (4 or 8 bytes), the subtraction wraps size to ~SIZE_MAX. The while (size &amp;gt; 0) loop then continues for an astronomical number of iterations. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.24.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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