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      <title>CVE-2026-39306 — PraisonAI recipe registry pull path traversal writes files outside the chosen output directory</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-39306</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; MervinPraison PraisonAI&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 1.5.113, PraisonAI&amp;#39;s recipe registry pull flow extracts attacker-controlled .praison tar archives with tar.extractall() and does not validate archive member paths before extraction. A malicious publisher can upload a recipe bundle that contains ../ traversal entries and any user who later pulls that recipe will write files outside the output directory they selected. This is a path traversal / arbitrary file write vulnerability on the client side of the recipe registry workflow. It affects both the local registry pull path and the HTTP registry pull path. The checksum verification does not prevent exploitation because the malicious traversal payload is part of the signed bundle itself. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.5.113.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; MervinPraison PraisonAI&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 1.5.113, PraisonAI&amp;#39;s recipe registry pull flow extracts attacker-controlled .praison tar archives with tar.extractall() and does not validate archive member paths before extraction. A malicious publisher can upload a recipe bundle that contains ../ traversal entries and any user who later pulls that recipe will write files outside the output directory they selected. This is a path traversal / arbitrary file write vulnerability on the client side of the recipe registry workflow. It affects both the local registry pull path and the HTTP registry pull path. The checksum verification does not prevent exploitation because the malicious traversal payload is part of the signed bundle itself. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.5.113.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-39306</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>PYSEC-2026-2900 — PraisonAI recipe registry pull path traversal writes files outside the chosen output directory</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-2900</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: praisonai&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;PraisonAI&amp;#39;s recipe registry pull flow extracts attacker-controlled `.praison` tar archives with `tar.extractall()` and does not validate archive member paths before extraction. A malicious publisher can upload a recipe bundle that contains `../` traversal entries and any user who later pulls that recipe will write files outside the output directory they selected.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is a path traversal / arbitrary file write vulnerability on the client side of the recipe registry workflow. It affects both the local registry pull path and the HTTP registry pull path. The checksum verification does not prevent exploitation because the malicious traversal payload is part of the signed bundle itself.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The issue is caused by unsafe extraction of tar archive contents during recipe pull.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. A malicious publisher creates a valid `.praison` bundle whose `manifest.json` is benign enough to pass publish, but whose tar members include traversal entries such as:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```text
../../escape-http.txt
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;2. `LocalRegistry.publish()` in `src/praisonai/praisonai/recipe/registry.py:214-287` only reads `manifest.json`, calculates a checksum, and stores the uploaded bundle. It does not inspect or sanitize the rest of the tar members before saving the archive.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;3. When a victim later pulls the recipe from a local registry, `LocalRegistry.pull()` in `src/praisonai/praisonai/recipe/registry.py:289-345` extracts the tarball directly:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
recipe_dir = output_dir / name
recipe_dir.mkdi…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: praisonai&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;PraisonAI&amp;#39;s recipe registry pull flow extracts attacker-controlled `.praison` tar archives with `tar.extractall()` and does not validate archive member paths before extraction. A malicious publisher can upload a recipe bundle that contains `../` traversal entries and any user who later pulls that recipe will write files outside the output directory they selected.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is a path traversal / arbitrary file write vulnerability on the client side of the recipe registry workflow. It affects both the local registry pull path and the HTTP registry pull path. The checksum verification does not prevent exploitation because the malicious traversal payload is part of the signed bundle itself.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The issue is caused by unsafe extraction of tar archive contents during recipe pull.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. A malicious publisher creates a valid `.praison` bundle whose `manifest.json` is benign enough to pass publish, but whose tar members include traversal entries such as:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```text
../../escape-http.txt
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;2. `LocalRegistry.publish()` in `src/praisonai/praisonai/recipe/registry.py:214-287` only reads `manifest.json`, calculates a checksum, and stores the uploaded bundle. It does not inspect or sanitize the rest of the tar members before saving the archive.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;3. When a victim later pulls the recipe from a local registry, `LocalRegistry.pull()` in `src/praisonai/praisonai/recipe/registry.py:289-345` extracts the tarball directly:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
recipe_dir = output_dir / name
recipe_dir.mkdi…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-2900</guid>
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