https://vulnerability.circl.lu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Tue, 29 Sep 2026 07:43:01 +0000 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bdu:2026-14926 bdu:2026-14926 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bdu:2026-14926 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-93603 <p>vm2 through 3.12.0 (fixed in 3.12.1) does not correctly handle a nullish `this` receiver in the apply trap of its bridge (lib/bridge.js): when sandboxed code calls a host-provided non-strict (sloppy-mode) function without a receiver — e.g. `fn()`, a detached method, `fn.call()`, `fn.apply(undefined)`, `Reflect.apply(fn, undefined, [])`, or `fn.bind()()` — the undefined receiver is passed straight through to the host call, and V8 substitutes the host realm&#39;s global object for `this`. vm2 then wraps and returns that object to the sandbox, giving sandboxed script a live proxy of the host global. This allows a complete sandbox escape: untrusted script can reach `process` and execute arbitrary code/commands on the host (for example via `process.getBuiltinModule(&#39;child_process&#39;).execSync`). Exploitation requires that the embedding application expose at least one non-strict host function to the sandbox; strict-mode and ES module host functions are not affected.</p> <p>vm2 through 3.12.0 (fixed in 3.12.1) does not correctly handle a nullish `this` receiver in the apply trap of its bridge (lib/bridge.js): when sandboxed code calls a host-provided non-strict (sloppy-mode) function without a receiver — e.g. `fn()`, a detached method, `fn.call()`, `fn.apply(undefined)`, `Reflect.apply(fn, undefined, [])`, or `fn.bind()()` — the undefined receiver is passed straight through to the host call, and V8 substitutes the host realm&#39;s global object for `this`. vm2 then wraps and returns that object to the sandbox, giving sandboxed script a live proxy of the host global. This allows a complete sandbox escape: untrusted script can reach `process` and execute arbitrary code/commands on the host (for example via `process.getBuiltinModule(&#39;child_process&#39;).execSync`). Exploitation requires that the embedding application expose at least one non-strict host function to the sandbox; strict-mode and ES module host functions are not affected.</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-93603 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-2mqq-5j76-f3c6 <p>vm2 through 3.12.0 (fixed in 3.12.1) does not correctly handle a nullish `this` receiver in the apply trap of its bridge (lib/bridge.js): when sandboxed code calls a host-provided non-strict (sloppy-mode) function without a receiver — e.g. `fn()`, a detached method, `fn.call()`, `fn.apply(undefined)`, `Reflect.apply(fn, undefined, [])`, or `fn.bind()()` — the undefined receiver is passed straight through to the host call, and V8 substitutes the host realm&#39;s global object for `this`. vm2 then wraps and returns that object to the sandbox, giving sandboxed script a live proxy of the host global. This allows a complete sandbox escape: untrusted script can reach `process` and execute arbitrary code/commands on the host (for example via `process.getBuiltinModule(&#39;child_process&#39;).execSync`). Exploitation requires that the embedding application expose at least one non-strict host function to the sandbox; strict-mode and ES module host functions are not affected.</p> <p>vm2 through 3.12.0 (fixed in 3.12.1) does not correctly handle a nullish `this` receiver in the apply trap of its bridge (lib/bridge.js): when sandboxed code calls a host-provided non-strict (sloppy-mode) function without a receiver — e.g. `fn()`, a detached method, `fn.call()`, `fn.apply(undefined)`, `Reflect.apply(fn, undefined, [])`, or `fn.bind()()` — the undefined receiver is passed straight through to the host call, and V8 substitutes the host realm&#39;s global object for `this`. vm2 then wraps and returns that object to the sandbox, giving sandboxed script a live proxy of the host global. This allows a complete sandbox escape: untrusted script can reach `process` and execute arbitrary code/commands on the host (for example via `process.getBuiltinModule(&#39;child_process&#39;).execSync`). Exploitation requires that the embedding application expose at least one non-strict host function to the sandbox; strict-mode and ES module host functions are not affected.</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-2mqq-5j76-f3c6