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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 22:34:18 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2026-92521</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bell-cve-2026-92521</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bell-cve-2026-92521</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-92521</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-92521</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ACPI: PCI: Clear driver_data on all paths that free the acpi_pci_root&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;acpi_pci_root_add() assigns the freshly allocated root to
device-&amp;gt;driver_data before dmar_device_add() and pci_acpi_scan_root().
Both failure paths reach the end: label where root is kfree()&amp;#39;d, but
only the pci_acpi_scan_root() path clears driver_data first.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When dmar_device_add() fails during a hot-add, root is freed while
device-&amp;gt;driver_data still points at it.  The ACPI core does not clear
driver_data on attach failure, so a later acpi_pci_find_root() call may
dereference this dangling pointer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;acpi_pci_root_remove() has the same problem: it frees root without
clearing device-&amp;gt;driver_data, leaving a dangling pointer behind after
the root bridge is removed.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Move the NULL assignment to the shared end: label so every error path in
acpi_pci_root_add() clears driver_data before freeing root, and clear it
in acpi_pci_root_remove() as well, so the object is never left reachable
through driver_data after being freed.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ACPI: PCI: Clear driver_data on all paths that free the acpi_pci_root&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;acpi_pci_root_add() assigns the freshly allocated root to
device-&amp;gt;driver_data before dmar_device_add() and pci_acpi_scan_root().
Both failure paths reach the end: label where root is kfree()&amp;#39;d, but
only the pci_acpi_scan_root() path clears driver_data first.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When dmar_device_add() fails during a hot-add, root is freed while
device-&amp;gt;driver_data still points at it.  The ACPI core does not clear
driver_data on attach failure, so a later acpi_pci_find_root() call may
dereference this dangling pointer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;acpi_pci_root_remove() has the same problem: it frees root without
clearing device-&amp;gt;driver_data, leaving a dangling pointer behind after
the root bridge is removed.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Move the NULL assignment to the shared end: label so every error path in
acpi_pci_root_add() clears driver_data before freeing root, and clear it
in acpi_pci_root_remove() as well, so the object is never left reachable
through driver_data after being freed.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-92521</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-5pq6-vgcp-vv3f</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-5pq6-vgcp-vv3f</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ACPI: PCI: Clear driver_data on all paths that free the acpi_pci_root&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;acpi_pci_root_add() assigns the freshly allocated root to
device-&amp;gt;driver_data before dmar_device_add() and pci_acpi_scan_root().
Both failure paths reach the end: label where root is kfree()&amp;#39;d, but
only the pci_acpi_scan_root() path clears driver_data first.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When dmar_device_add() fails during a hot-add, root is freed while
device-&amp;gt;driver_data still points at it.  The ACPI core does not clear
driver_data on attach failure, so a later acpi_pci_find_root() call may
dereference this dangling pointer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;acpi_pci_root_remove() has the same problem: it frees root without
clearing device-&amp;gt;driver_data, leaving a dangling pointer behind after
the root bridge is removed.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Move the NULL assignment to the shared end: label so every error path in
acpi_pci_root_add() clears driver_data before freeing root, and clear it
in acpi_pci_root_remove() as well, so the object is never left reachable
through driver_data after being freed.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ACPI: PCI: Clear driver_data on all paths that free the acpi_pci_root&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;acpi_pci_root_add() assigns the freshly allocated root to
device-&amp;gt;driver_data before dmar_device_add() and pci_acpi_scan_root().
Both failure paths reach the end: label where root is kfree()&amp;#39;d, but
only the pci_acpi_scan_root() path clears driver_data first.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When dmar_device_add() fails during a hot-add, root is freed while
device-&amp;gt;driver_data still points at it.  The ACPI core does not clear
driver_data on attach failure, so a later acpi_pci_find_root() call may
dereference this dangling pointer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;acpi_pci_root_remove() has the same problem: it frees root without
clearing device-&amp;gt;driver_data, leaving a dangling pointer behind after
the root bridge is removed.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Move the NULL assignment to the shared end: label so every error path in
acpi_pci_root_add() clears driver_data before freeing root, and clear it
in acpi_pci_root_remove() as well, so the object is never left reachable
through driver_data after being freed.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-5pq6-vgcp-vv3f</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>openSUSE-SU-2026:11893-1 — kernel-devel-7.2.8-1.1 on GA media</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11893-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;kernel-devel-7.2.8-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;kernel-devel-7.2.8-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11893-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-92521</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-92521</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 246 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ACPI: PCI: Clear driver_data on all paths that free the acpi_pci_root acpi_pci_root_add() assigns the freshly allocated root to device-&amp;gt;driver_data before dmar_device_add() and pci_acpi_scan_root(). Both failure paths reach the end: label where root is kfree()&amp;#39;d, but only the pci_acpi_scan_root() path clears driver_data first. When dmar_device_add() fails during a hot-add, root is freed while device-&amp;gt;driver_data still points at it.  The ACPI core does not clear driver_data on attach failure, so a later acpi_pci_find_root() call may dereference this dangling pointer. acpi_pci_root_remove() has the same problem: it frees root without clearing device-&amp;gt;driver_data, leaving a dangling pointer behind after the root bridge is removed. Move the NULL assignment to the shared end: label so every error path in acpi_pci_root_add() clears driver_data before freeing root, and clear it in acpi_pci_root_remove() as well, so the object is never left reachable through driver_data after being freed.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 246 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ACPI: PCI: Clear driver_data on all paths that free the acpi_pci_root acpi_pci_root_add() assigns the freshly allocated root to device-&amp;gt;driver_data before dmar_device_add() and pci_acpi_scan_root(). Both failure paths reach the end: label where root is kfree()&amp;#39;d, but only the pci_acpi_scan_root() path clears driver_data first. When dmar_device_add() fails during a hot-add, root is freed while device-&amp;gt;driver_data still points at it.  The ACPI core does not clear driver_data on attach failure, so a later acpi_pci_find_root() call may dereference this dangling pointer. acpi_pci_root_remove() has the same problem: it frees root without clearing device-&amp;gt;driver_data, leaving a dangling pointer behind after the root bridge is removed. Move the NULL assignment to the shared end: label so every error path in acpi_pci_root_add() clears driver_data before freeing root, and clear it in acpi_pci_root_remove() as well, so the object is never left reachable through driver_data after being freed.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-92521</guid>
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