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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-91129</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-91129</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Home Assistant is open source home automation software focused on local control and privacy. Prior to 2026.2.3, the IPP integration automatically processed unauthenticated _ipp._tcp.local mDNS announcements in homeassistant/components/ipp/config_flow.py, where async_step_zeroconf passed attacker-controlled host, port, and base_path values to validate_input for printer metadata retrieval. Because the shared HTTP client followed attacker-controlled cross-origin redirects without blocking loopback targets, a local-network attacker could redirect the request to 127.0.0.1 or another internal service without user interaction or prior IPP configuration. This issue is fixed in version 2026.2.3.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Home Assistant is open source home automation software focused on local control and privacy. Prior to 2026.2.3, the IPP integration automatically processed unauthenticated _ipp._tcp.local mDNS announcements in homeassistant/components/ipp/config_flow.py, where async_step_zeroconf passed attacker-controlled host, port, and base_path values to validate_input for printer metadata retrieval. Because the shared HTTP client followed attacker-controlled cross-origin redirects without blocking loopback targets, a local-network attacker could redirect the request to 127.0.0.1 or another internal service without user interaction or prior IPP configuration. This issue is fixed in version 2026.2.3.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-91129</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-4ghv-53cq-7wp3 — Home Assistant: mDNS Server-Side Request Forgery</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-4ghv-53cq-7wp3</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: homeassistant&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Home Assistant Green is vulnerable to a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) via the mDNS/Zeroconf IPP integration. An unauthenticated attacker on the local network can send a crafted mDNS response to trick Home Assistant into making HTTP requests to arbitrary hosts, including internal services bound to localhost. The IPP integration automatically processes `_ipp._tcp.local` service announcements without any user interaction or authentication, and follows HTTP redirects from the attacker-controlled host.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Home Assistant listens for mDNS service announcements on port 5353. When a service of type `_ipp._tcp.local` is discovered, the IPP integration&amp;#39;s zeroconf handler (`homeassistant/components/ipp/config_flow.py`) processes it automatically.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `async_step_zeroconf` method extracts `host`, `port`, and `base_path` directly from the mDNS discovery info without validation:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
async def async_step_zeroconf(
    self, discovery_info: ZeroconfServiceInfo
) -&amp;gt; ConfigFlowResult:
    host = discovery_info.host
    port = discovery_info.port
    zctype = discovery_info.type
    name = discovery_info.name.replace(f&amp;#34;.{zctype}&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;&amp;#34;)
    tls = zctype == &amp;#34;_ipps._tcp.local.&amp;#34;
    base_path = discovery_info.properties.get(&amp;#34;rp&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;ipp/print&amp;#34;)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;self.discovery_info.update(
        {
            CONF_HOST: host,
            CONF_PORT: port,
            CONF_SSL: tls,
            CONF_VERIFY_SSL: False,
            CONF_BASE_PATH: f&amp;#34;/{base_path}&amp;#34;,
            CONF_…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: homeassistant&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Home Assistant Green is vulnerable to a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) via the mDNS/Zeroconf IPP integration. An unauthenticated attacker on the local network can send a crafted mDNS response to trick Home Assistant into making HTTP requests to arbitrary hosts, including internal services bound to localhost. The IPP integration automatically processes `_ipp._tcp.local` service announcements without any user interaction or authentication, and follows HTTP redirects from the attacker-controlled host.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Home Assistant listens for mDNS service announcements on port 5353. When a service of type `_ipp._tcp.local` is discovered, the IPP integration&amp;#39;s zeroconf handler (`homeassistant/components/ipp/config_flow.py`) processes it automatically.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `async_step_zeroconf` method extracts `host`, `port`, and `base_path` directly from the mDNS discovery info without validation:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
async def async_step_zeroconf(
    self, discovery_info: ZeroconfServiceInfo
) -&amp;gt; ConfigFlowResult:
    host = discovery_info.host
    port = discovery_info.port
    zctype = discovery_info.type
    name = discovery_info.name.replace(f&amp;#34;.{zctype}&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;&amp;#34;)
    tls = zctype == &amp;#34;_ipps._tcp.local.&amp;#34;
    base_path = discovery_info.properties.get(&amp;#34;rp&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;ipp/print&amp;#34;)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;self.discovery_info.update(
        {
            CONF_HOST: host,
            CONF_PORT: port,
            CONF_SSL: tls,
            CONF_VERIFY_SSL: False,
            CONF_BASE_PATH: f&amp;#34;/{base_path}&amp;#34;,
            CONF_…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-4ghv-53cq-7wp3</guid>
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