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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2026 03:45:23 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2026-90431</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bell-cve-2026-90431</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bell-cve-2026-90431</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-90431</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-90431</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;remoteproc: Prevent crash handling to race with rproc_del()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;There&amp;#39;s no synchronization between rproc_crash_handler_work() and
rproc_del(), as such it&amp;#39;s possible for a driver to be removed while
crash-handler work is scheduled, or even executing - resulting in
use-after-free issues.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;To avoid this the scheduled work need to be cancelled and synchronized
against before the removal proceeds.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In order to ensure that this doesn&amp;#39;t race with the reporting, and
thereby scheduling new work, a &amp;#34;deleting&amp;#34; flag is introduced. This is
similar to the RPROC_DELETE state that was introduced to ensure that
&amp;#34;start&amp;#34; didn&amp;#39;t race with rproc_del(), but the existing mechanism can not
be used as it&amp;#39;s valid to call rproc_report_crash() in atomic context -
and the &amp;#34;state&amp;#34; is protected by a mutex.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the event that work is cancelled the pm_stay_awake() is left
unbalanced and need to be unrolled.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The blocking and cancelling of crash-handler work prior to the actual
rproc_shutdown() call does have the explicit side-effect that crashes
resulting from the shutdown process will not enter the crash-handling
path, and as such will not generate devcoredumps etc. Due to the
existing mutual exclusion between these code paths there&amp;#39;s no concrete
reduction in functionality, but further work would be needed to handle
this case.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;remoteproc: Prevent crash handling to race with rproc_del()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;There&amp;#39;s no synchronization between rproc_crash_handler_work() and
rproc_del(), as such it&amp;#39;s possible for a driver to be removed while
crash-handler work is scheduled, or even executing - resulting in
use-after-free issues.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;To avoid this the scheduled work need to be cancelled and synchronized
against before the removal proceeds.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In order to ensure that this doesn&amp;#39;t race with the reporting, and
thereby scheduling new work, a &amp;#34;deleting&amp;#34; flag is introduced. This is
similar to the RPROC_DELETE state that was introduced to ensure that
&amp;#34;start&amp;#34; didn&amp;#39;t race with rproc_del(), but the existing mechanism can not
be used as it&amp;#39;s valid to call rproc_report_crash() in atomic context -
and the &amp;#34;state&amp;#34; is protected by a mutex.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the event that work is cancelled the pm_stay_awake() is left
unbalanced and need to be unrolled.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The blocking and cancelling of crash-handler work prior to the actual
rproc_shutdown() call does have the explicit side-effect that crashes
resulting from the shutdown process will not enter the crash-handling
path, and as such will not generate devcoredumps etc. Due to the
existing mutual exclusion between these code paths there&amp;#39;s no concrete
reduction in functionality, but further work would be needed to handle
this case.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-90431</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-j445-23gj-v4rv</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-j445-23gj-v4rv</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;remoteproc: Prevent crash handling to race with rproc_del()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;There&amp;#39;s no synchronization between rproc_crash_handler_work() and
rproc_del(), as such it&amp;#39;s possible for a driver to be removed while
crash-handler work is scheduled, or even executing - resulting in
use-after-free issues.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;To avoid this the scheduled work need to be cancelled and synchronized
against before the removal proceeds.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In order to ensure that this doesn&amp;#39;t race with the reporting, and
thereby scheduling new work, a &amp;#34;deleting&amp;#34; flag is introduced. This is
similar to the RPROC_DELETE state that was introduced to ensure that
&amp;#34;start&amp;#34; didn&amp;#39;t race with rproc_del(), but the existing mechanism can not
be used as it&amp;#39;s valid to call rproc_report_crash() in atomic context -
and the &amp;#34;state&amp;#34; is protected by a mutex.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the event that work is cancelled the pm_stay_awake() is left
unbalanced and need to be unrolled.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The blocking and cancelling of crash-handler work prior to the actual
rproc_shutdown() call does have the explicit side-effect that crashes
resulting from the shutdown process will not enter the crash-handling
path, and as such will not generate devcoredumps etc. Due to the
existing mutual exclusion between these code paths there&amp;#39;s no concrete
reduction in functionality, but further work would be needed to handle
this case.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;remoteproc: Prevent crash handling to race with rproc_del()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;There&amp;#39;s no synchronization between rproc_crash_handler_work() and
rproc_del(), as such it&amp;#39;s possible for a driver to be removed while
crash-handler work is scheduled, or even executing - resulting in
use-after-free issues.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;To avoid this the scheduled work need to be cancelled and synchronized
against before the removal proceeds.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In order to ensure that this doesn&amp;#39;t race with the reporting, and
thereby scheduling new work, a &amp;#34;deleting&amp;#34; flag is introduced. This is
similar to the RPROC_DELETE state that was introduced to ensure that
&amp;#34;start&amp;#34; didn&amp;#39;t race with rproc_del(), but the existing mechanism can not
be used as it&amp;#39;s valid to call rproc_report_crash() in atomic context -
and the &amp;#34;state&amp;#34; is protected by a mutex.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the event that work is cancelled the pm_stay_awake() is left
unbalanced and need to be unrolled.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The blocking and cancelling of crash-handler work prior to the actual
rproc_shutdown() call does have the explicit side-effect that crashes
resulting from the shutdown process will not enter the crash-handling
path, and as such will not generate devcoredumps etc. Due to the
existing mutual exclusion between these code paths there&amp;#39;s no concrete
reduction in functionality, but further work would be needed to handle
this case.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-j445-23gj-v4rv</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>openSUSE-SU-2026:11893-1 — kernel-devel-7.2.8-1.1 on GA media</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11893-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;kernel-devel-7.2.8-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;kernel-devel-7.2.8-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11893-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-90431</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-90431</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 246 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: remoteproc: Prevent crash handling to race with rproc_del() There&amp;#39;s no synchronization between rproc_crash_handler_work() and rproc_del(), as such it&amp;#39;s possible for a driver to be removed while crash-handler work is scheduled, or even executing - resulting in use-after-free issues. To avoid this the scheduled work need to be cancelled and synchronized against before the removal proceeds. In order to ensure that this doesn&amp;#39;t race with the reporting, and thereby scheduling new work, a &amp;#34;deleting&amp;#34; flag is introduced. This is similar to the RPROC_DELETE state that was introduced to ensure that &amp;#34;start&amp;#34; didn&amp;#39;t race with rproc_del(), but the existing mechanism can not be used as it&amp;#39;s valid to call rproc_report_crash() in atomic context - and the &amp;#34;state&amp;#34; is protected by a mutex. In the event that work is cancelled the pm_stay_awake() is left unbalanced and need to be unrolled. The blocking and cancelling of crash-handler work prior to the actual rproc_shutdown() call does have the explicit side-effect that crashes resulting from the shutdown process will not enter the crash-handling path, and as such will not generate devcoredumps etc. Due to the existing mutual exclusion between these code paths there&amp;#39;s no concrete reduction in functionality, but further work would be needed to handle this case.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 246 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: remoteproc: Prevent crash handling to race with rproc_del() There&amp;#39;s no synchronization between rproc_crash_handler_work() and rproc_del(), as such it&amp;#39;s possible for a driver to be removed while crash-handler work is scheduled, or even executing - resulting in use-after-free issues. To avoid this the scheduled work need to be cancelled and synchronized against before the removal proceeds. In order to ensure that this doesn&amp;#39;t race with the reporting, and thereby scheduling new work, a &amp;#34;deleting&amp;#34; flag is introduced. This is similar to the RPROC_DELETE state that was introduced to ensure that &amp;#34;start&amp;#34; didn&amp;#39;t race with rproc_del(), but the existing mechanism can not be used as it&amp;#39;s valid to call rproc_report_crash() in atomic context - and the &amp;#34;state&amp;#34; is protected by a mutex. In the event that work is cancelled the pm_stay_awake() is left unbalanced and need to be unrolled. The blocking and cancelling of crash-handler work prior to the actual rproc_shutdown() call does have the explicit side-effect that crashes resulting from the shutdown process will not enter the crash-handling path, and as such will not generate devcoredumps etc. Due to the existing mutual exclusion between these code paths there&amp;#39;s no concrete reduction in functionality, but further work would be needed to handle this case.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-90431</guid>
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