fkie_cve-2026-85715

ExifReader is a JavaScript Exif information parser. Prior to 4.41.1, ExifReader parses attacker-controlled HEIC or AVIF ISO-BMFF files in getItems() within src/image-header-iso-bmff-iloc.js and trusts iloc itemCount and extentCount values while allocating an extent object for every nested-loop iteration. When offsetSize, lengthSize, baseOffsetSize, and indexSize are zero, the extent fields consume no input bytes and the buffer offset does not advance, but the parser can still allocate up to itemCount multiplied by extentCount objects without an allocation budget. A small malicious iloc box can therefore cause hundreds of megabytes of heap growth or exhaust system memory, terminating a Node.js process and denying service to web, desktop, or mobile applications that parse untrusted images. The zero field widths are valid ISO-BMFF values indicating absent fields, so the vulnerable parser must bound work rather than relying on offset advancement. The issue is fixed in version 4.41.1.

GHSA-pj96-35fp-cfcc — ExifReader: DoS via Crafted HEIC/AVIF iloc Box - Memory Exhaustion

Affected: npm: exifreader

## Summary ExifReader 4.41.0 is vulnerable to denial of service through a crafted HEIC or AVIF file with a malicious `iloc` box. When `offsetSize`, `lengthSize`, and `baseOffsetSize` are set to zero in the iloc header, the extent-parsing loop allocates an unbounded number of JavaScript objects - up to `itemCount × extentCount` (65535 × 65535 = 4.3 billion) - without advancing the buffer offset. A 652-byte file causes 400MB of heap growth; a 6KB file exhausts all system memory and crashes the Node.js process with a JavaScript heap out-of-memory error.

## Affected version tested

- npm package: `exifreader` - Version: `4.41.0` - Affected formats: HEIC, AVIF (ISO-BMFF container)

## Root cause

**File:** `src/image-header-iso-bmff-iloc.js`, lines 79–116, function `getItems()`.

The iloc parser reads four size fields from the file (each a 4-bit nibble, valid values 0–15):

| Field | Controls | |-------|----------| | `offsetSize` | Bytes per extent offset | | `lengthSize` | Bytes per extent length | | `baseOffsetSize` | Bytes per item base offset | | `indexSize` | Bytes per extent index |

The code then enters a nested loop: for each item (up to 65535), and for each extent within that item (up to 65535), it reads variable-width fields and advances the buffer offset by the corresponding size:

```javascript for (let j = 0; j < item.extentCount; j++) { const extent = {}; extent.extentIndex = getExtentIndex(dataView, version, offset, indexSize); offset += sizes.item.ext…

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fkie_cve-2026-85715

GHSA-pj96-35fp-cfcc — ExifReader: DoS via Crafted HEIC/AVIF iloc Box - Memory Exhaustion