https://vulnerability.circl.lu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Tue, 29 Sep 2026 18:55:12 +0000 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bdu:2026-13262 bdu:2026-13262 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bdu:2026-13262 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/brew-acronym-cve-2026-81726 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Homebrew: acronym</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>Several model-artifact APIs still treat caller-controlled model paths as ordinary filenames even when NLTK path security is enforced. The same outside-root paths are rejected by guarded helpers, but these public read and write flows still use raw file APIs.</p> <p>### Details</p> <p>- **Vulnerability type:** File sandbox bypass - **Affected component:** `TransitionParser.train`, `TransitionParser.parse`, `AveragedPerceptron.save`, `AveragedPerceptron.load`, `PerceptronTagger.save_to_json`, `save_maxent_params` - **Affected versions:** Published `3.9.4` and current source `v3.10.0-rc2` both reproduced. - **Patched versions:** Not yet patched - **Root cause:** Model import and export helpers use built-in `open()` on caller-controlled paths instead of pathsec-aware helpers.</p> <p>`TransitionParser.train()` writes outside allowed roots, `TransitionParser.parse()` reads outside allowed roots, `AveragedPerceptron` bypasses the sandbox in both directions, and adjacent read-side helpers in the same family already show the intended guarded behavior. I confirmed outside-root reads and writes while `pathsec.open()` or the guarded sibling helpers rejected the same paths.</p> <p>### PoC</p> <p>**Preconditions** - The application enables `pathsec` enforcement and lets untrusted workflows choose model import or export paths.</p> <p>**Steps** 1. Enable `pathsec.ENFORCE=True` and restrict allowed roots to a dedicated sandbox directory. 2. Use public model import or export APIs with paths that point outside that r…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Homebrew: acronym</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>Several model-artifact APIs still treat caller-controlled model paths as ordinary filenames even when NLTK path security is enforced. The same outside-root paths are rejected by guarded helpers, but these public read and write flows still use raw file APIs.</p> <p>### Details</p> <p>- **Vulnerability type:** File sandbox bypass - **Affected component:** `TransitionParser.train`, `TransitionParser.parse`, `AveragedPerceptron.save`, `AveragedPerceptron.load`, `PerceptronTagger.save_to_json`, `save_maxent_params` - **Affected versions:** Published `3.9.4` and current source `v3.10.0-rc2` both reproduced. - **Patched versions:** Not yet patched - **Root cause:** Model import and export helpers use built-in `open()` on caller-controlled paths instead of pathsec-aware helpers.</p> <p>`TransitionParser.train()` writes outside allowed roots, `TransitionParser.parse()` reads outside allowed roots, `AveragedPerceptron` bypasses the sandbox in both directions, and adjacent read-side helpers in the same family already show the intended guarded behavior. I confirmed outside-root reads and writes while `pathsec.open()` or the guarded sibling helpers rejected the same paths.</p> <p>### PoC</p> <p>**Preconditions** - The application enables `pathsec` enforcement and lets untrusted workflows choose model import or export paths.</p> <p>**Steps** 1. Enable `pathsec.ENFORCE=True` and restrict allowed roots to a dedicated sandbox directory. 2. Use public model import or export APIs with paths that point outside that r…</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/brew-acronym-cve-2026-81726 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-81726 <p>NLTK through 3.10.3 contains a path traversal vulnerability in model-artifact APIs that bypass pathsec enforcement by using raw file operations on caller-controlled paths. Attackers can read or write files outside allowed sandbox roots through TransitionParser, AveragedPerceptron, PerceptronTagger, and maxent parameter APIs when pathsec is enabled.</p> <p>NLTK through 3.10.3 contains a path traversal vulnerability in model-artifact APIs that bypass pathsec enforcement by using raw file operations on caller-controlled paths. Attackers can read or write files outside allowed sandbox roots through TransitionParser, AveragedPerceptron, PerceptronTagger, and maxent parameter APIs when pathsec is enabled.</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-81726 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-8mgp-746c-j5xp <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: nltk</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>Several model-artifact APIs still treat caller-controlled model paths as ordinary filenames even when NLTK path security is enforced. The same outside-root paths are rejected by guarded helpers, but these public read and write flows still use raw file APIs.</p> <p>### Details</p> <p>- **Vulnerability type:** File sandbox bypass - **Affected component:** `TransitionParser.train`, `TransitionParser.parse`, `AveragedPerceptron.save`, `AveragedPerceptron.load`, `PerceptronTagger.save_to_json`, `save_maxent_params` - **Affected versions:** Published `3.9.4` and current source `v3.10.0-rc2` both reproduced. - **Patched versions:** Not yet patched - **Root cause:** Model import and export helpers use built-in `open()` on caller-controlled paths instead of pathsec-aware helpers.</p> <p>`TransitionParser.train()` writes outside allowed roots, `TransitionParser.parse()` reads outside allowed roots, `AveragedPerceptron` bypasses the sandbox in both directions, and adjacent read-side helpers in the same family already show the intended guarded behavior. I confirmed outside-root reads and writes while `pathsec.open()` or the guarded sibling helpers rejected the same paths.</p> <p>### PoC</p> <p>**Preconditions** - The application enables `pathsec` enforcement and lets untrusted workflows choose model import or export paths.</p> <p>**Steps** 1. Enable `pathsec.ENFORCE=True` and restrict allowed roots to a dedicated sandbox directory. 2. Use public model import or export APIs with paths that point outside that r…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: nltk</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>Several model-artifact APIs still treat caller-controlled model paths as ordinary filenames even when NLTK path security is enforced. The same outside-root paths are rejected by guarded helpers, but these public read and write flows still use raw file APIs.</p> <p>### Details</p> <p>- **Vulnerability type:** File sandbox bypass - **Affected component:** `TransitionParser.train`, `TransitionParser.parse`, `AveragedPerceptron.save`, `AveragedPerceptron.load`, `PerceptronTagger.save_to_json`, `save_maxent_params` - **Affected versions:** Published `3.9.4` and current source `v3.10.0-rc2` both reproduced. - **Patched versions:** Not yet patched - **Root cause:** Model import and export helpers use built-in `open()` on caller-controlled paths instead of pathsec-aware helpers.</p> <p>`TransitionParser.train()` writes outside allowed roots, `TransitionParser.parse()` reads outside allowed roots, `AveragedPerceptron` bypasses the sandbox in both directions, and adjacent read-side helpers in the same family already show the intended guarded behavior. I confirmed outside-root reads and writes while `pathsec.open()` or the guarded sibling helpers rejected the same paths.</p> <p>### PoC</p> <p>**Preconditions** - The application enables `pathsec` enforcement and lets untrusted workflows choose model import or export paths.</p> <p>**Steps** 1. Enable `pathsec.ENFORCE=True` and restrict allowed roots to a dedicated sandbox directory. 2. Use public model import or export APIs with paths that point outside that r…</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-8mgp-746c-j5xp https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-3740 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: nltk</p> <p>NLTK through 3.10.3 contains a path traversal vulnerability in model-artifact APIs that bypass pathsec enforcement by using raw file operations on caller-controlled paths. Attackers can read or write files outside allowed sandbox roots through TransitionParser, AveragedPerceptron, PerceptronTagger, and maxent parameter APIs when pathsec is enabled.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: nltk</p> <p>NLTK through 3.10.3 contains a path traversal vulnerability in model-artifact APIs that bypass pathsec enforcement by using raw file operations on caller-controlled paths. Attackers can read or write files outside allowed sandbox roots through TransitionParser, AveragedPerceptron, PerceptronTagger, and maxent parameter APIs when pathsec is enabled.</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-3740 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-81726 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: nltk, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: nltk, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: nltk, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: nltk, Ubuntu:Pro:22.04:LTS: nltk, Ubuntu:Pro:24.04:LTS: nltk, Ubuntu:Pro:26.04:LTS: nltk</p> <p>NLTK through 3.10.3 contains a path traversal vulnerability in model-artifact APIs that bypass pathsec enforcement by using raw file operations on caller-controlled paths. Attackers can read or write files outside allowed sandbox roots through TransitionParser, AveragedPerceptron, PerceptronTagger, and maxent parameter APIs when pathsec is enabled.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: nltk, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: nltk, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: nltk, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: nltk, Ubuntu:Pro:22.04:LTS: nltk, Ubuntu:Pro:24.04:LTS: nltk, Ubuntu:Pro:26.04:LTS: nltk</p> <p>NLTK through 3.10.3 contains a path traversal vulnerability in model-artifact APIs that bypass pathsec enforcement by using raw file operations on caller-controlled paths. Attackers can read or write files outside allowed sandbox roots through TransitionParser, AveragedPerceptron, PerceptronTagger, and maxent parameter APIs when pathsec is enabled.</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-81726