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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Thu, 01 Oct 2026 03:01:58 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2026-80693</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bell-cve-2026-80693</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bell-cve-2026-80693</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-80693</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-80693</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;idpf: bound interrupt-vector register fill to the allocated array&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;idpf_get_reg_intr_vecs() fills the caller-allocated reg_vals[] array from
the VIRTCHNL2_OP_ALLOC_VECTORS reply in adapter-&amp;gt;req_vec_chunks, bounding
its inner loop only by the per-chunk num_vectors. The array is sized
separately: idpf_intr_reg_init() allocates
kzalloc_objs(struct idpf_vec_regs, total_vecs) from
caps.num_allocated_vectors and only checks the returned count after the
fill. The sum of per-chunk num_vectors is never reconciled against
total_vecs, so a reply with a small num_allocated_vectors but chunks
summing higher writes past the end of reg_vals[].&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Impact: a control plane (a PF or hypervisor device model) that returns a
VIRTCHNL2_OP_ALLOC_VECTORS reply whose per-chunk num_vectors sum exceeds
num_allocated_vectors writes struct idpf_vec_regs entries past the end of
the reg_vals kmalloc allocation (KASAN slab-out-of-bounds write).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Bound the fill loop to the array capacity passed in by the callers,
mirroring the sibling idpf_vport_get_q_reg(). The existing
num_regs &amp;lt; num_vecs check then rejects an undersized reply without the
out-of-bounds write happening first.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;idpf: bound interrupt-vector register fill to the allocated array&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;idpf_get_reg_intr_vecs() fills the caller-allocated reg_vals[] array from
the VIRTCHNL2_OP_ALLOC_VECTORS reply in adapter-&amp;gt;req_vec_chunks, bounding
its inner loop only by the per-chunk num_vectors. The array is sized
separately: idpf_intr_reg_init() allocates
kzalloc_objs(struct idpf_vec_regs, total_vecs) from
caps.num_allocated_vectors and only checks the returned count after the
fill. The sum of per-chunk num_vectors is never reconciled against
total_vecs, so a reply with a small num_allocated_vectors but chunks
summing higher writes past the end of reg_vals[].&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Impact: a control plane (a PF or hypervisor device model) that returns a
VIRTCHNL2_OP_ALLOC_VECTORS reply whose per-chunk num_vectors sum exceeds
num_allocated_vectors writes struct idpf_vec_regs entries past the end of
the reg_vals kmalloc allocation (KASAN slab-out-of-bounds write).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Bound the fill loop to the array capacity passed in by the callers,
mirroring the sibling idpf_vport_get_q_reg(). The existing
num_regs &amp;lt; num_vecs check then rejects an undersized reply without the
out-of-bounds write happening first.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-80693</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-h68f-vq23-xjh9</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-h68f-vq23-xjh9</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;idpf: bound interrupt-vector register fill to the allocated array&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;idpf_get_reg_intr_vecs() fills the caller-allocated reg_vals[] array from
the VIRTCHNL2_OP_ALLOC_VECTORS reply in adapter-&amp;gt;req_vec_chunks, bounding
its inner loop only by the per-chunk num_vectors. The array is sized
separately: idpf_intr_reg_init() allocates
kzalloc_objs(struct idpf_vec_regs, total_vecs) from
caps.num_allocated_vectors and only checks the returned count after the
fill. The sum of per-chunk num_vectors is never reconciled against
total_vecs, so a reply with a small num_allocated_vectors but chunks
summing higher writes past the end of reg_vals[].&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Impact: a control plane (a PF or hypervisor device model) that returns a
VIRTCHNL2_OP_ALLOC_VECTORS reply whose per-chunk num_vectors sum exceeds
num_allocated_vectors writes struct idpf_vec_regs entries past the end of
the reg_vals kmalloc allocation (KASAN slab-out-of-bounds write).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Bound the fill loop to the array capacity passed in by the callers,
mirroring the sibling idpf_vport_get_q_reg(). The existing
num_regs &amp;lt; num_vecs check then rejects an undersized reply without the
out-of-bounds write happening first.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;idpf: bound interrupt-vector register fill to the allocated array&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;idpf_get_reg_intr_vecs() fills the caller-allocated reg_vals[] array from
the VIRTCHNL2_OP_ALLOC_VECTORS reply in adapter-&amp;gt;req_vec_chunks, bounding
its inner loop only by the per-chunk num_vectors. The array is sized
separately: idpf_intr_reg_init() allocates
kzalloc_objs(struct idpf_vec_regs, total_vecs) from
caps.num_allocated_vectors and only checks the returned count after the
fill. The sum of per-chunk num_vectors is never reconciled against
total_vecs, so a reply with a small num_allocated_vectors but chunks
summing higher writes past the end of reg_vals[].&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Impact: a control plane (a PF or hypervisor device model) that returns a
VIRTCHNL2_OP_ALLOC_VECTORS reply whose per-chunk num_vectors sum exceeds
num_allocated_vectors writes struct idpf_vec_regs entries past the end of
the reg_vals kmalloc allocation (KASAN slab-out-of-bounds write).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Bound the fill loop to the array capacity passed in by the callers,
mirroring the sibling idpf_vport_get_q_reg(). The existing
num_regs &amp;lt; num_vecs check then rejects an undersized reply without the
out-of-bounds write happening first.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-h68f-vq23-xjh9</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>openSUSE-SU-2026:21910-1 — Security update for the Linux Kernel</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:21910-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Security update for the Linux Kernel&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Security update for the Linux Kernel&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:21910-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>SUSE-SU-2026:23881-1 — Security update for the Linux Kernel</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/suse-su-2026:23881-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Security update for the Linux Kernel&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Security update for the Linux Kernel&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/suse-su-2026:23881-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-80693</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-80693</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 158 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: idpf: bound interrupt-vector register fill to the allocated array idpf_get_reg_intr_vecs() fills the caller-allocated reg_vals[] array from the VIRTCHNL2_OP_ALLOC_VECTORS reply in adapter-&amp;gt;req_vec_chunks, bounding its inner loop only by the per-chunk num_vectors. The array is sized separately: idpf_intr_reg_init() allocates kzalloc_objs(struct idpf_vec_regs, total_vecs) from caps.num_allocated_vectors and only checks the returned count after the fill. The sum of per-chunk num_vectors is never reconciled against total_vecs, so a reply with a small num_allocated_vectors but chunks summing higher writes past the end of reg_vals[]. Impact: a control plane (a PF or hypervisor device model) that returns a VIRTCHNL2_OP_ALLOC_VECTORS reply whose per-chunk num_vectors sum exceeds num_allocated_vectors writes struct idpf_vec_regs entries past the end of the reg_vals kmalloc allocation (KASAN slab-out-of-bounds write). Bound the fill loop to the array capacity passed in by the callers, mirroring the sibling idpf_vport_get_q_reg(). The existing num_regs &amp;lt; num_vecs check then rejects an undersized reply without the out-of-bounds write happening first.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 158 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: idpf: bound interrupt-vector register fill to the allocated array idpf_get_reg_intr_vecs() fills the caller-allocated reg_vals[] array from the VIRTCHNL2_OP_ALLOC_VECTORS reply in adapter-&amp;gt;req_vec_chunks, bounding its inner loop only by the per-chunk num_vectors. The array is sized separately: idpf_intr_reg_init() allocates kzalloc_objs(struct idpf_vec_regs, total_vecs) from caps.num_allocated_vectors and only checks the returned count after the fill. The sum of per-chunk num_vectors is never reconciled against total_vecs, so a reply with a small num_allocated_vectors but chunks summing higher writes past the end of reg_vals[]. Impact: a control plane (a PF or hypervisor device model) that returns a VIRTCHNL2_OP_ALLOC_VECTORS reply whose per-chunk num_vectors sum exceeds num_allocated_vectors writes struct idpf_vec_regs entries past the end of the reg_vals kmalloc allocation (KASAN slab-out-of-bounds write). Bound the fill loop to the array capacity passed in by the callers, mirroring the sibling idpf_vport_get_q_reg(). The existing num_regs &amp;lt; num_vecs check then rejects an undersized reply without the out-of-bounds write happening first.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-80693</guid>
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