https://vulnerability.circl.lu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Thu, 01 Oct 2026 05:59:51 +0000 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-77257 <p>MCP Atlassian is a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for Atlassian products (Confluence and Jira). Prior to 0.22.0, HTTP-exposed Jira and Confluence upload tools pass a caller-provided file_path to local file operations without restricting it to the workspace. A remote MCP caller with tool access can cause the server to read sensitive local files and upload them as Atlassian attachments. The advisory traces the vulnerable input and processing flow through streamable-http, upload_attachment, and file_path, which identify the affected entry points, controls, and code paths. This issue is fixed in version 0.22.0.</p> <p>MCP Atlassian is a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for Atlassian products (Confluence and Jira). Prior to 0.22.0, HTTP-exposed Jira and Confluence upload tools pass a caller-provided file_path to local file operations without restricting it to the workspace. A remote MCP caller with tool access can cause the server to read sensitive local files and upload them as Atlassian attachments. The advisory traces the vulnerable input and processing flow through streamable-http, upload_attachment, and file_path, which identify the affected entry points, controls, and code paths. This issue is fixed in version 0.22.0.</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-77257 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-mrq8-fv7v-hhjg <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: mcp-atlassian</p> <p># sooperset/mcp-atlassian: HTTP upload tools can attach arbitrary server-local files</p> <p>Date: 2026-05-05 Target: `sooperset/mcp-atlassian` Commit: `d8bc78698a63cb6b321c7ca796d6329d448f7f6d`</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>`mcp-atlassian` supports HTTP/SSE deployment for persistent, remote, and multi-user use. In that mode, write-capable Jira and Confluence attachment flows accept caller-controlled server-local file paths and read those paths without an upload-source allowlist or base directory restriction.</p> <p>An authenticated caller, or a prompt-injected agent with tool-call capability, can cause the MCP server process to read a local file it can access and attach that file into a Jira issue or Confluence page using configured Atlassian credentials.</p> <p>This is distinct from the prior download-path advisory: that issue was an arbitrary file write sink. This path is upload-source local file disclosure.</p> <p>## Impact</p> <p>Impact is local file disclosure through an authenticated Atlassian attachment write. In Docker/Kubernetes deployments that mount `.env` or token material into the service, exposed files may include API tokens, OAuth credentials, service configuration, or other local secrets readable by the MCP process.</p> <p>The issue is bounded by tool access and Atlassian permissions: the attacker needs an MCP call path to a write tool and an issue/page where the attachment can be written. It is not direct RCE.</p> <p>Severity is Medium-to-High depending on deployment:</p> <p>- Medium for single-user/local stdio usage or t…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: mcp-atlassian</p> <p># sooperset/mcp-atlassian: HTTP upload tools can attach arbitrary server-local files</p> <p>Date: 2026-05-05 Target: `sooperset/mcp-atlassian` Commit: `d8bc78698a63cb6b321c7ca796d6329d448f7f6d`</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>`mcp-atlassian` supports HTTP/SSE deployment for persistent, remote, and multi-user use. In that mode, write-capable Jira and Confluence attachment flows accept caller-controlled server-local file paths and read those paths without an upload-source allowlist or base directory restriction.</p> <p>An authenticated caller, or a prompt-injected agent with tool-call capability, can cause the MCP server process to read a local file it can access and attach that file into a Jira issue or Confluence page using configured Atlassian credentials.</p> <p>This is distinct from the prior download-path advisory: that issue was an arbitrary file write sink. This path is upload-source local file disclosure.</p> <p>## Impact</p> <p>Impact is local file disclosure through an authenticated Atlassian attachment write. In Docker/Kubernetes deployments that mount `.env` or token material into the service, exposed files may include API tokens, OAuth credentials, service configuration, or other local secrets readable by the MCP process.</p> <p>The issue is bounded by tool access and Atlassian permissions: the attacker needs an MCP call path to a write tool and an issue/page where the attachment can be written. It is not direct RCE.</p> <p>Severity is Medium-to-High depending on deployment:</p> <p>- Medium for single-user/local stdio usage or t…</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-mrq8-fv7v-hhjg