https://vulnerability.circl.lu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Wed, 30 Sep 2026 16:55:34 +0000 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bdu:2026-12059 bdu:2026-12059 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bdu:2026-12059 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/brew-aider-cve-2026-76219 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Homebrew: aider</p> <p>## Summary `IndexFile.from_tree`, `IndexFile.reset` (→ from_tree) and `IndexFile.merge_tree` append caller-influenced treeish strings positionally to `git read-tree` with no unsafe-option guard, no `allow_unsafe_options` parameter, and no `--` separator. `git read-tree --index-output=&lt;file&gt;` writes the resulting index to an arbitrary path, and last-occurrence-wins lets an injected `--index-output` override the method&#39;s internal temp path — clobbering an arbitrary file with a valid git-index blob. This is a distinct, never-guarded sink: commit `3af0c251` (GHSA-3f7w-8rr8-f37f) guarded only `checkout_index` and `tag`; `read_tree` was left unprotected (it is among the acknowledged unguarded call sites in that advisory&#39;s sweep but was never reported or fixed).</p> <p>## Root Cause `from_tree` (index/base.py:388), `reset` (delegates to from_tree), and `merge_tree` (index/base.py:291) call `repo.git.read_tree(*arg_list)` with no `check_unsafe_options` and no `--`. The treeish is caller-influenced and positional.</p> <p>## Impact Arbitrary file overwrite / destruction at the privileges of the host process. Content is constrained to a git-index blob (not attacker-chosen, so not RCE), but the target path is fully attacker-controlled — corrupting/truncating configs or destroying files at attacker-chosen writable locations = I:H + A:H (per the skill&#39;s &#34;overwrite-any-path = I:H&#34; rule). Pure VALUE control (positional treeish). Default configuration.</p> <p>## Proof of Concept ```python IndexFile.from_tree(…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Homebrew: aider</p> <p>## Summary `IndexFile.from_tree`, `IndexFile.reset` (→ from_tree) and `IndexFile.merge_tree` append caller-influenced treeish strings positionally to `git read-tree` with no unsafe-option guard, no `allow_unsafe_options` parameter, and no `--` separator. `git read-tree --index-output=&lt;file&gt;` writes the resulting index to an arbitrary path, and last-occurrence-wins lets an injected `--index-output` override the method&#39;s internal temp path — clobbering an arbitrary file with a valid git-index blob. This is a distinct, never-guarded sink: commit `3af0c251` (GHSA-3f7w-8rr8-f37f) guarded only `checkout_index` and `tag`; `read_tree` was left unprotected (it is among the acknowledged unguarded call sites in that advisory&#39;s sweep but was never reported or fixed).</p> <p>## Root Cause `from_tree` (index/base.py:388), `reset` (delegates to from_tree), and `merge_tree` (index/base.py:291) call `repo.git.read_tree(*arg_list)` with no `check_unsafe_options` and no `--`. The treeish is caller-influenced and positional.</p> <p>## Impact Arbitrary file overwrite / destruction at the privileges of the host process. Content is constrained to a git-index blob (not attacker-chosen, so not RCE), but the target path is fully attacker-controlled — corrupting/truncating configs or destroying files at attacker-chosen writable locations = I:H + A:H (per the skill&#39;s &#34;overwrite-any-path = I:H&#34; rule). Pure VALUE control (positional treeish). Default configuration.</p> <p>## Proof of Concept ```python IndexFile.from_tree(…</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/brew-aider-cve-2026-76219 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-76219 <p>GitPython versions before 3.1.58 contain an arbitrary file overwrite vulnerability in IndexFile.from_tree, IndexFile.reset, and IndexFile.merge_tree methods that append caller-influenced treeish strings to git read-tree without option validation or argument separation. Attackers can inject the --index-output option to overwrite arbitrary files with a valid git-index blob, destroying existing file content at attacker-controlled writable paths.</p> <p>GitPython versions before 3.1.58 contain an arbitrary file overwrite vulnerability in IndexFile.from_tree, IndexFile.reset, and IndexFile.merge_tree methods that append caller-influenced treeish strings to git read-tree without option validation or argument separation. Attackers can inject the --index-output option to overwrite arbitrary files with a valid git-index blob, destroying existing file content at attacker-controlled writable paths.</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-76219 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-4gmw-gg2m-w46p <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: GitPython</p> <p>## Summary `IndexFile.from_tree`, `IndexFile.reset` (→ from_tree) and `IndexFile.merge_tree` append caller-influenced treeish strings positionally to `git read-tree` with no unsafe-option guard, no `allow_unsafe_options` parameter, and no `--` separator. `git read-tree --index-output=&lt;file&gt;` writes the resulting index to an arbitrary path, and last-occurrence-wins lets an injected `--index-output` override the method&#39;s internal temp path — clobbering an arbitrary file with a valid git-index blob. This is a distinct, never-guarded sink: commit `3af0c251` (GHSA-3f7w-8rr8-f37f) guarded only `checkout_index` and `tag`; `read_tree` was left unprotected (it is among the acknowledged unguarded call sites in that advisory&#39;s sweep but was never reported or fixed).</p> <p>## Root Cause `from_tree` (index/base.py:388), `reset` (delegates to from_tree), and `merge_tree` (index/base.py:291) call `repo.git.read_tree(*arg_list)` with no `check_unsafe_options` and no `--`. The treeish is caller-influenced and positional.</p> <p>## Impact Arbitrary file overwrite / destruction at the privileges of the host process. Content is constrained to a git-index blob (not attacker-chosen, so not RCE), but the target path is fully attacker-controlled — corrupting/truncating configs or destroying files at attacker-chosen writable locations = I:H + A:H (per the skill&#39;s &#34;overwrite-any-path = I:H&#34; rule). Pure VALUE control (positional treeish). Default configuration.</p> <p>## Proof of Concept ```python IndexFile.from_tree(…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: GitPython</p> <p>## Summary `IndexFile.from_tree`, `IndexFile.reset` (→ from_tree) and `IndexFile.merge_tree` append caller-influenced treeish strings positionally to `git read-tree` with no unsafe-option guard, no `allow_unsafe_options` parameter, and no `--` separator. `git read-tree --index-output=&lt;file&gt;` writes the resulting index to an arbitrary path, and last-occurrence-wins lets an injected `--index-output` override the method&#39;s internal temp path — clobbering an arbitrary file with a valid git-index blob. This is a distinct, never-guarded sink: commit `3af0c251` (GHSA-3f7w-8rr8-f37f) guarded only `checkout_index` and `tag`; `read_tree` was left unprotected (it is among the acknowledged unguarded call sites in that advisory&#39;s sweep but was never reported or fixed).</p> <p>## Root Cause `from_tree` (index/base.py:388), `reset` (delegates to from_tree), and `merge_tree` (index/base.py:291) call `repo.git.read_tree(*arg_list)` with no `check_unsafe_options` and no `--`. The treeish is caller-influenced and positional.</p> <p>## Impact Arbitrary file overwrite / destruction at the privileges of the host process. Content is constrained to a git-index blob (not attacker-chosen, so not RCE), but the target path is fully attacker-controlled — corrupting/truncating configs or destroying files at attacker-chosen writable locations = I:H + A:H (per the skill&#39;s &#34;overwrite-any-path = I:H&#34; rule). Pure VALUE control (positional treeish). Default configuration.</p> <p>## Proof of Concept ```python IndexFile.from_tree(…</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-4gmw-gg2m-w46p https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/oesa-2026-3699 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> openEuler:24.03-LTS-SP1: python-GitPython</p> <p>GitPython is a python library used to interact with git repositories, high-level like git-porcelain, or low-level like git-plumbing. Security Fix(es):</p> <p>GitPython before 3.1.57 contains an incomplete denylist in the unsafe_git_archive_options guard that omits --add-file and --add-virtual-file options. Attackers can supply these options to Repo.archive() to read arbitrary files from the filesystem and include them in the returned archive.(CVE-2026-73619)</p> <p>GitPython before 3.1.57 fails to guard git option forwarding in IndexFile.checkout() and TagReference.create(), allowing attackers to pass unsafe options via kwargs. Attackers can use --prefix to overwrite arbitrary files with repository content or -F to read arbitrary files returned in-band.(CVE-2026-73620)</p> <p>GitPython before 3.1.56 contains an argument injection vulnerability in the Commit.count() method, which forwards keyword arguments to &amp;apos;git rev-list&amp;apos; without the check_unsafe_options guard present in the sibling iter_items method. An attacker who can control options passed to Commit.count (e.g., via an application that forwards a user-supplied options dict) can supply output=&amp;lt;path&amp;gt;, causing &amp;apos;git rev-list --output=&amp;lt;path&amp;gt;&amp;apos; to open and truncate the target file to zero bytes before revision parsing. This allows destruction/blanking of an arbitrary file at the process&amp;apos;s privilege level (no content control, 0-byte truncation).(CVE-2026-73621)</p> <p>GitPython before 3.1.55 fails to disable env…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> openEuler:24.03-LTS-SP1: python-GitPython</p> <p>GitPython is a python library used to interact with git repositories, high-level like git-porcelain, or low-level like git-plumbing. Security Fix(es):</p> <p>GitPython before 3.1.57 contains an incomplete denylist in the unsafe_git_archive_options guard that omits --add-file and --add-virtual-file options. Attackers can supply these options to Repo.archive() to read arbitrary files from the filesystem and include them in the returned archive.(CVE-2026-73619)</p> <p>GitPython before 3.1.57 fails to guard git option forwarding in IndexFile.checkout() and TagReference.create(), allowing attackers to pass unsafe options via kwargs. Attackers can use --prefix to overwrite arbitrary files with repository content or -F to read arbitrary files returned in-band.(CVE-2026-73620)</p> <p>GitPython before 3.1.56 contains an argument injection vulnerability in the Commit.count() method, which forwards keyword arguments to &amp;apos;git rev-list&amp;apos; without the check_unsafe_options guard present in the sibling iter_items method. An attacker who can control options passed to Commit.count (e.g., via an application that forwards a user-supplied options dict) can supply output=&amp;lt;path&amp;gt;, causing &amp;apos;git rev-list --output=&amp;lt;path&amp;gt;&amp;apos; to open and truncate the target file to zero bytes before revision parsing. This allows destruction/blanking of an arbitrary file at the process&amp;apos;s privilege level (no content control, 0-byte truncation).(CVE-2026-73621)</p> <p>GitPython before 3.1.55 fails to disable env…</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/oesa-2026-3699 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11566-1 <p>python313-GitPython-3.1.59-2.1 on GA media</p> <p>python313-GitPython-3.1.59-2.1 on GA media</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11566-1 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-3838 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: gitpython</p> <p>## Summary `IndexFile.from_tree`, `IndexFile.reset` (→ from_tree) and `IndexFile.merge_tree` append caller-influenced treeish strings positionally to `git read-tree` with no unsafe-option guard, no `allow_unsafe_options` parameter, and no `--` separator. `git read-tree --index-output=&lt;file&gt;` writes the resulting index to an arbitrary path, and last-occurrence-wins lets an injected `--index-output` override the method&#39;s internal temp path — clobbering an arbitrary file with a valid git-index blob. This is a distinct, never-guarded sink: commit `3af0c251` (GHSA-3f7w-8rr8-f37f) guarded only `checkout_index` and `tag`; `read_tree` was left unprotected (it is among the acknowledged unguarded call sites in that advisory&#39;s sweep but was never reported or fixed).</p> <p>## Root Cause `from_tree` (index/base.py:388), `reset` (delegates to from_tree), and `merge_tree` (index/base.py:291) call `repo.git.read_tree(*arg_list)` with no `check_unsafe_options` and no `--`. The treeish is caller-influenced and positional.</p> <p>## Impact Arbitrary file overwrite / destruction at the privileges of the host process. Content is constrained to a git-index blob (not attacker-chosen, so not RCE), but the target path is fully attacker-controlled — corrupting/truncating configs or destroying files at attacker-chosen writable locations = I:H + A:H (per the skill&#39;s &#34;overwrite-any-path = I:H&#34; rule). Pure VALUE control (positional treeish). Default configuration.</p> <p>## Proof of Concept ```python IndexFile.from_tree(…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: gitpython</p> <p>## Summary `IndexFile.from_tree`, `IndexFile.reset` (→ from_tree) and `IndexFile.merge_tree` append caller-influenced treeish strings positionally to `git read-tree` with no unsafe-option guard, no `allow_unsafe_options` parameter, and no `--` separator. `git read-tree --index-output=&lt;file&gt;` writes the resulting index to an arbitrary path, and last-occurrence-wins lets an injected `--index-output` override the method&#39;s internal temp path — clobbering an arbitrary file with a valid git-index blob. This is a distinct, never-guarded sink: commit `3af0c251` (GHSA-3f7w-8rr8-f37f) guarded only `checkout_index` and `tag`; `read_tree` was left unprotected (it is among the acknowledged unguarded call sites in that advisory&#39;s sweep but was never reported or fixed).</p> <p>## Root Cause `from_tree` (index/base.py:388), `reset` (delegates to from_tree), and `merge_tree` (index/base.py:291) call `repo.git.read_tree(*arg_list)` with no `check_unsafe_options` and no `--`. The treeish is caller-influenced and positional.</p> <p>## Impact Arbitrary file overwrite / destruction at the privileges of the host process. Content is constrained to a git-index blob (not attacker-chosen, so not RCE), but the target path is fully attacker-controlled — corrupting/truncating configs or destroying files at attacker-chosen writable locations = I:H + A:H (per the skill&#39;s &#34;overwrite-any-path = I:H&#34; rule). Pure VALUE control (positional treeish). Default configuration.</p> <p>## Proof of Concept ```python IndexFile.from_tree(…</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-3838 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/rhsa-2026:63385 <p>jetty: Eclipse Jetty: Information disclosure due to retained HTTP/1.1 trailers across connections ansible-core: argument injection in ansible-galaxy role install leads to arbitrary code execution ansible-core: argument injection in ansible-galaxy collection install via git clone (incomplete fix for CVE-2026-11332) aiohttp: AIOHTTP: Arbitrary code execution via untrusted input to CookieJar.load() GitPython: GitPython: Arbitrary command execution due to bypass of dangerous Git option checks GitPython: GitPython: Arbitrary code execution via improper validation of clone options GitPython: GitPython: Arbitrary code execution via injected newlines in Git configuration ruby-jwt: ruby-jwt: Authentication bypass due to empty key in HMAC verification jackson-databind: jackson-databind: Arbitrary code execution via PolymorphicTypeValidator bypass com.fasterxml.jackson.core/jackson-core: tools.jackson.core/jackson-core: jackson-core: Denial of Service via incomplete fix in async JSON parser aiohttp: AIOHTTP: HTTP Request Smuggling via WebSocket Upgrade aiohttp: AIOHTTP: Denial of Service via malformed HTTP responses gitpython: GitPython: Arbitrary file overwrite and read via unsafe git option forwarding gitpython: GitPython: Information disclosure via environment variable expansion in URL handling gitpython: GitPython: Remote Code Execution via malicious Git template gitpython: GitPython: Arbitrary File Overwrite via improper git option validation gitpython: GitPython: Remote Code Exec…</p> <p>jetty: Eclipse Jetty: Information disclosure due to retained HTTP/1.1 trailers across connections ansible-core: argument injection in ansible-galaxy role install leads to arbitrary code execution ansible-core: argument injection in ansible-galaxy collection install via git clone (incomplete fix for CVE-2026-11332) aiohttp: AIOHTTP: Arbitrary code execution via untrusted input to CookieJar.load() GitPython: GitPython: Arbitrary command execution due to bypass of dangerous Git option checks GitPython: GitPython: Arbitrary code execution via improper validation of clone options GitPython: GitPython: Arbitrary code execution via injected newlines in Git configuration ruby-jwt: ruby-jwt: Authentication bypass due to empty key in HMAC verification jackson-databind: jackson-databind: Arbitrary code execution via PolymorphicTypeValidator bypass com.fasterxml.jackson.core/jackson-core: tools.jackson.core/jackson-core: jackson-core: Denial of Service via incomplete fix in async JSON parser aiohttp: AIOHTTP: HTTP Request Smuggling via WebSocket Upgrade aiohttp: AIOHTTP: Denial of Service via malformed HTTP responses gitpython: GitPython: Arbitrary file overwrite and read via unsafe git option forwarding gitpython: GitPython: Information disclosure via environment variable expansion in URL handling gitpython: GitPython: Remote Code Execution via malicious Git template gitpython: GitPython: Arbitrary File Overwrite via improper git option validation gitpython: GitPython: Remote Code Exec…</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/rhsa-2026:63385 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-76219 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: python-git, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: python-git, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: python-git, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: python-git, Ubuntu:Pro:22.04:LTS: python-git, Ubuntu:Pro:24.04:LTS: python-git, Ubuntu:Pro:26.04:LTS: python-git</p> <p>GitPython versions before 3.1.58 contain an arbitrary file overwrite vulnerability in IndexFile.from_tree, IndexFile.reset, and IndexFile.merge_tree methods that append caller-influenced treeish strings to git read-tree without option validation or argument separation. Attackers can inject the --index-output option to overwrite arbitrary files with a valid git-index blob, destroying existing file content at attacker-controlled writable paths.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: python-git, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: python-git, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: python-git, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: python-git, Ubuntu:Pro:22.04:LTS: python-git, Ubuntu:Pro:24.04:LTS: python-git, Ubuntu:Pro:26.04:LTS: python-git</p> <p>GitPython versions before 3.1.58 contain an arbitrary file overwrite vulnerability in IndexFile.from_tree, IndexFile.reset, and IndexFile.merge_tree methods that append caller-influenced treeish strings to git read-tree without option validation or argument separation. Attackers can inject the --index-output option to overwrite arbitrary files with a valid git-index blob, destroying existing file content at attacker-controlled writable paths.</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-76219